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I. INTRODUCTION
A private-sector employer in the United States may fire an employee
for the employee's political views.2 During the 1992 presidential campaign,
employers required that employees sit through a presidential candidate's stump
speech as part of a company-wide captive audience. 3 Employees commented to
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I As used in this paper, "private sector" employment includes all but government
employment. The term includes nonprofit employers and private employers with substantial
government contracts or grants. "Public sector" employment includes employment by
federal, state, and local government, including municipalities, school boards, state
institutions of higher education, and similar boards or commissions that represent political
subdivisions of a state.
2 There are limited areas of protection for certain categories of expression. For
example, the National Labor Relations Act protects speech on unionization. 29 U.S.C.
§§ 157, 158(c) (1988). See generally Staughton Lynd, Employee Speech in the Private and
Public Workplace: Two Doctrines or One?, 1 INDus. REL. L.J. 711 (1977) (arguing that
similar limits are applied to public employees and unionized private sector employees who
engage in disruptive speech). To varying degrees, the developing cause of action for
wrongful or retaliatory discharge protects whistleblowers. See generally 1 LEx K. LARSON,
UNJUST DISMIsSAL (1993); IRA MICHAEL SHEPARD Er AL., WrrHour JuST CAUSE (1989);
PROTECING UNORGANIZED EMPLOYEES AGAINST UNJUST DISCHARGE (Jack Steiber & John
Blackhorn eds., 1983).
Most states protect employees' right to vote, see infra notes 48-50 and accompanying
text, but only Connecticut explicitly protects employees' free speech rights, CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 31-51q (1992). For more detailed discussion of employees' existing protection, see
Terry Ann Halbert, The First Amendment in the Workplace: An Analysis and Call for
Refonn, 17 SErON HALL L. REv. 42 (1987).
3 Rowland Evans & Robert Novak, Bush Takes Message of Care to New Hampshire,
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reporters that they did not feel free to leave. 4 A CEO sent faxes to regional
managers strongly recommending that they purchase seats at a candidate's
fundraiser if they intended to have a future with the corporation; one who failed
to do so lost his job.5 These examples illustrate the trend that employees are
increasingly experiencing pressure to support the political candidate or cause
that the employer believes best serves the corporate interest.
This Article examines this trend and suggests a framework for a private
legal remedy when the employer crosses the boundary from influence to
coercion by dismissing an employee in retaliation for that employee's exercise
of the right to free speech. First, the Article addresses how the problem has
evolved and the traditional reluctance of courts to protect employees' political
activities from employer retaliation. Second, the Article discusses policy
reasons why state courts should use the First Amendment in wrongful
discharge actions to protect employee political speech and discusses the results
of a survey on employer influence upon employee political activities. 6 Third, it
THE HmAL)-TMms (Bloomington, IN), Jan. 18, 1992, at A6.
4 The courts have long held that the right to be free from unwanted speech is itself a
form of free speech. See, e.g., Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728
(1970).
5 Neiss v. Cherry Payment Sys., Inc., No. 92-C-403-S (W.D. Wis. July 17, 1992).
The plaintiff alleged his employer fired him the day after he refused to contribute to the
President's Dinner, a Republican fundraiser for House and Senate candidates. Federal
District Court Judge Shabaz denied the employer's motion to dismiss a wrongful discharge
claim made under Wisconsin law.
6 The term "wrongful discharge" refers to causes of action sounding in tort or
contract. Historically, all employment was terminable at will, that is, with or without cause.
1 LARsoN, supra note 2, § 2.04; Jay M. Feinman, The Development of the Employment at
Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 118 (1976). Since the late 1970s, state courts have begun
to limit the doctrine of employment at will through a civil cause of action for retaliatory or
wrongful discharge. 1 LARSON, supra note 2, § 2.07. In general, an employee may recover
damages if the employer terminated employment in retaliation for employee conduct that is
protected by a substantial and important public policy. The employee has the burden of
proving that the conduct is protected, that the public policy at stake is sufficiently important,
and that the employer actually fired the employee in retaliation for the conduct. The burden
of proof then shifts to the employer. The employer may avoid liability by proving a
permissible ground for dismissal. What represents a sufficiently important public policy
varies from state to state. The highest courts of more than two-thirds of the states have
recognized the cause of action. Id. See generally Michael A. DiSabatino, Annotation,
Modem Status of Rule That Employer May Discharge At-Will Employee for Any Reason, 12
A.L.R. 4TH 544 (1982). This Article suggests a remedy that uses the First Amendment and
comparable state constitutional provisions as a source of public policy in wrongful discharge
actions under state law. Although in some circumstances state constitutions may provide
broader protection for speech than does the First Amendment, this Article does not
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addresses the constitutional issue implicit in courts' condoning employer
conduct that infringes upon employee free speech rights. Specifically, in the
common law tort of wrongful discharge, state courts have created a
classification based on the content of a private-sector employee's speech. State
courts do recognize a cause of action when an employee speaks out on
violations of law or when the employee claims benefits to which she is legally
entitled but do not recognize a cause of action when an employee engages in
political speech outside the workplace. This classification disadvantages
political speech, the category of speech courts traditionally give the highest
protection in First Amendment jurisprudence. State courts engage in state
action within the reach of the Constitution by creating this classification. Courts
may avoid the constitutional problem by using the First Amendment as the
basis for a wrongful discharge claim.
Finally, this Article examines the limits of this new remedy, which can be
drawn from analogous public-sector cases. In the public sector, an employee
may speak out on a matter of public concern, but the courts will weigh the
employee's interest in speech against the public employer's interest in the
efficient operation of the workplace. In addition, courts have recognized
exceptions for certain categories of policy-maldng and confidential employees,
who forfeit certain First Amendment protections by virtue of their job function.
Courts should move to recognize the tort of wrongful discharge in instances
when an employer retaliates against an employee for nondisruptive political
speech.
II. How COURTS TREAT EMPLOYER INTERFERENCE WITH EMPLOYEE
FREE SPEECH RIGHTS
In Coppage v. Kansas, the Supreme Court held that it did not represent
any form of duress, coercion, or undue influence for an employer to fire an
employee who joined a labor union in breach of a written agreement that he
separately consider state law protection of free speeh. The basic argument would apply
equally to state and federal constitutional provisions. This Article does not attempt a
comprehensive review of the ever-growing literature on wrongful discharge and
employment at will. For a review of major pieces in the literature, see PAUL C. WEILER,
GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE (1990). See also Lawrence E. Blades, Employment at Will vs.
Individual Freedom: Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLuM. L. REv.
1404 (1967); Martin H. Malin, Protecting the Whistleblowerfrom Retaliatory Discharge, 16
U. MIcH. J.L. REF. 277 (1983); Clyde W. Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust
Dismissal: YTime for a Statute, 62 VA. L. REV. 481 (1976); Note, Protecting At Will
Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Tenninate Only in Good Faith, 93
HArY. L. REv. 1816 (1980).
1994]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
would not do so.7 Apart from the tumultuous history of early labor
7 Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915). The Kansas legislature had adopted a statute
forbidding employers to exact a promise not to join or retain membership in a labor
organization as a condition of securing or retaining employment. In an early application of
substantive due process, the Court held that this statute infringed upon the Fourteenth
Amendment right of freedom of contract:
[W]e have nothing to do with any question of actual or implied coercion or duress,
such as might overcome the will of the employ6 by means unlawful without the act. In
the case before us, the state court treated the term "coerce" as applying to the mere
insistence by the employer, or its agent, upon its right to prescribe terms upon which
alone it would consent to a continuance of the relationship of employer and employ6.
Id. at 8. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes dissented, reasoning that there was nothing in the
Constitution to prevent a state from "establishing an equality of position between the parties
in which liberty of contract begins." Id. at 27 (Holmes, J., dissenting). The more articulate
dissent was Justice Day's:
The right to join labor unions is undisputed .... Acting within their legal rights,
such associations are as legitimate as any organization of citizens formed to promote
their common interest. They are organized under the laws of many States, by virtue of
express statutes passed for that purpose, and being legal, and acting within their
constitutional rights, the right to join them, as against coercive action to the contrary
may be the legitimate subject of protection in the exercise of the police authority of the
States.
It would be impossible to maintain that because one is free to accept or refuse a
given employment, or because one may at will employ or refuse to employ another, it
follows that the parties have a constitutional right to insert in an agreement of
employment any stipulation they choose. They cannot put in terms that are against
public policy either as it is deemed by the courts to exist at common law or as it may be
declared by the legislature as the arbiter within the limits of reason of the public policy
of the State.
Id. at 32, 35 (Day, J., dissenting). As one of a number of examples of how the state might
impose a limit on employers in the interest of public policy, Day observed: "Would it be
beyond a legitimate exercise of the police power to provide that an employ6 should not be
required to agree, as a condition of employment, to forego affiliation with a particular
political party, or the support of a particular candidate for office?" Id. at 37. On the
question of "coercion," Day reasoned: "[I]n view of the relative positions of employer and
employed, who is to deny that the stipulation here insisted upon and forbidden by the law is
essentially coercive? No form of words can strip it of its true character." Id. at 38. The
employer argued that because a union has a constitutional right to deny membership in
some circumstances, there cannot be a more restrictive rule for employers. Justice Day
responded that a church may deny membership to those who intermarry but that a railroad
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unionization, 8 there are few published cases in which an employee has brought
suit against an employer for interference with political expression.9 The earliest
reported cases involved direct employer attempts to control how an employee
voted. This practice was apparently prevalent enough to give rise to early state
legislation making it a crime for an employer to attempt to influence votes by
threatening discharge from employment.10
In 1928, in Vulcan Last Co. v. State, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin held
may not compel a worker to join or refrain from joining a church. Id. at 39. Instead, the
railroad may unite with other railroads to form organizations to protect their common
interests.
The law should be as zealous to protect the constitutional liberty of the employ6 as
it is to guard that of the employer. A principal object of this statute is to protect the
liberty of the citizen to make such lawful affiliations as he may desire with organizations
of his choice. It should not be necessary to the protection of the liberty of one citizen
that the same right in another citizen be abridged or destroyed.
Id. at 40. For an interesting commentary on the case, see Kenneth M. Casebeer, Teaching
an Old Dog Old Ticks: Coppage v. Kansas and At-Will Employment Revisited, 6 CARDozo
L. REV. 765 (1985). Remarkably, modem courts continue to conclude that an employer's
threat to fire an at will employee does not constitute duress or coercion. E.g., Zaccardi v.
Zale Corp., 856 F.2d 1473 (10th Cir. 1988) (reasoning that the threat to exercise a legal
right is not duress). However, the NLRB will consider such threats coercive in the context
of a union election campaign. See generally Julius G. Getman et al., NLRB Regulation of
Campaign Tactics: The BehavioralAssumptions on Which the Board Regulates, 27 STAN. L.
REv. 1465 (1975).
8 Issues of labor and politics have shaped our First Amendment jurisprudence. In
Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917),
Judge Learned Hand first articulates his broad view of the First Amendment which he later
persuades Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes to embrace. Masses involved the protesting of
military conscription through cartoons with captions such as "Making the World Safe for
Capitalism." The import of another cartoon was "obviously that conscription is the
destruction of youth, democracy, and labor, and the desolation of the family." Id. at 536.
9 See generally R.D. Hursh, Annotation, Discharge from Private Employment on
Ground of Political Views or Conduct, 51 A.L.R. 2D 742 (1957).
10 See generally E.H. Schopler, Annotation, Constitutionality of Statute Respecting
Employer's Control of or Interference with Political Affiliations or Activities of Employees,
166 A.L.R. 707 (1947). In general, courts have held that such statutes do not
unconstitutionally interfere with the employer's First Amendment rights. E.g., Santiago v.
Puerto Rico, 154 F.2d 811, 813 (1st Cir. 1946). In addition, these statutes are not
unconstitutionally vague. E.g., Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. Superior Court, 171 P.2d 21,
23-24 (Cal. 1946) (en bane). For current state statutes on employer interference with voting
and political activity, see infra notes 48-49.
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an employer criminally liable under such a statute11 when the employer called a
captive meeting of employees and publicly dismissed an employee who, in his
capacity as a member of the city common council, had voted against a
resolution on constructing waterworks that would benefit the employer.12
However, such criminal statutes did not give rise to a private cause of action
for damages. In 1934, a court overturned a jury award of punitive damages in a
case in which the employee claimed he was fired because he would not vote for
certain candidates at a city election and because he would not coerce members
of his family to vote for those candidates. 13 The court held that the trial judge
should have directed a verdict for the employer based upon the doctrine of
employment at will. Since the employee was employed for an indefinite term,
the employer could terminate his employment with or without cause at any
time. The court reasoned that even if the employer had violated a statute
making it a felony to attempt to influence an employee's vote by threatening
dismissal, the employment at will doctrine precluded a damage award.
14
Communism provided a new ground for employer interference with
employees' political views. In 1946, the California Supreme Court held that an
employer could discharge "an employee who advocates the overthrow of our
government by force or whose loyalty to the United States has not been
established to the satisfaction of the employer" and that such dismissal would
not violate a criminal statute prohibiting employers from controlling or
directing employees' political activities. 15 In 1954, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that Twentieth Century Fox could fire writer Ring Lardner
because he refused to answer the House Un-American Activities Committee's
questions on whether he was a member of the Communist Party. 16 The
Committee held him in contempt of Congress, and Lardner brought suit
I1 Vulcan Last Co. v. State, 217 N.W. 412 (Wis. 1928).
12 Id. at 413.
13 Bell v. Faulkner, 75 S.W.2d 612, 613 (Mo. Ct. App. 1934).
14 Id. at 614. See also, Harmon v. United Mine Workers, 266 S.W. 84 (Ark. 1924),
in which a union expelled an employee from membership for joining the Ku Klux Klan.
The employer fired the employee pursuant to a union shop agreement. The employee
sought actual and punitive damages, but the court dismissed the case on the basis of the
doctrine of employment at will. In Minis v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 200 F.2d 800,
801 (5th Cir. 1952), an employee suspected that his employer had fired him after 32 years
because he refused to contribute $1 to the campaign fund of Senator Taft of Ohio. He asked
a friend in the Senate to investigate his dismissal. The company president replied that the
employee had been dismissed for inefficiency, and the employee then unsuccessfully sought
to recover damages for libel and slander.
15 Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. Superior Court, 171 P.2d 21, 24 (Cal. 1946) (en bane).
16 Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Lardner, 216 F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 1954), cert.
denied, 348 U.S. 944 (1955).
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claiming breach of contract. The court reasoned that Lardner had violated a
clause of his employment contract that required that he not commit offenses
involving moral turpitude. 17
Courts reached analogous conclusions in cases where a collective
bargaining agreement covered employees. It was common practice for the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to require that union officials file
affidavits that they were not communists in order to be certified to represent a
bargaining unit.18 More recently, a court held that an employer may refuse to
permit a union to distribute leaflets recommending that employees vote for
certain political candidates for governor, senator, or state supreme court. 19 The
court reasoned that a leaflet focusing on the election of four candidates to
political office is not one intended to educate employees on political issues
relevant to employment conditions and thus does not fall within the National
Labor Relations Act's protection of activities for mutual aid and protection.20
The issue reached the United States Supreme Court in 1956. In Black v.
Cutter Laboratories,21 the Court let stand the California Supreme Court
decision that it was the "common knowledge of mankind" that a member of the
Communist Party could not be loyal to his private employer.22 The Court
expressly found no state action triggering federal constitutional rights.23
Vociferously dissenting, Chief Justice Warren, joined by Justice Douglas and
Justice Black, argued that there was ample state action to present a federal
question.24 In 1982, the Supreme Court again held that, in the absence of state
action, it would not intervene when a private employer fires employees in
17 Id. at 852. In a parallel case, Lester Cole lost his suit against Loew's on similar
grounds. Loew's, Inc. v. Cole, 185 F.2d 641, 658 (9th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S.
954 (1951).
18 See, e.g., Stewart-Warner Corp. v. NLRB, 194 F.2d 207, 210 (4th Cir. 1952)
(holding that employer did not violate National Labor Relations Act by continuing to
bargain with union that had filed requisite noncommunist affidavits while
noncomplying union pursued unfair labor practice charges); NLRB v. Pratt, Read &
Co., Inc., 191 F.2d 1006, 1009 (2d Cir. 1951) (noting that employer was not obliged
to bargain with union that failed to file noncommunist affidavits).
19 Local 174, UAW v. NLRB, 645 F.2d 1151, 1153-55 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
20 Id. at 1154. For a discussion of the impact on labor of the narrowing of the
permissible range of political discourse, see James B. Atleson, Reflections on Labor,
Power, and Society, 44 MD. L. REv. 841, 841 (1985).
21 351 U.S. 292 (1956).
22 Black v. Cutter Labs., 278 P.2d 905, 916 (Cal. 1955), cet. disnissed, 351 U.S.
292 (1956).
23 Black, 351 U.S. at 299.
2 4 Id. at 300 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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retaliation for their exercise of First Amendment rights. 25
A handful of cases have addressed the issue since the recognition of a
public policy exception to the doctrine of employment at will. The prevailing
view is that the First Amendment cannot be the basis of a public policy
exception in wrongful discharge claims in the absence of state action. The
Illinois Supreme Court gave the clearest statement of this view in Barr v.
Kelso-Burnett Co. 2 6 The employer fired a group of foremen at its nuclear
power plant after they discussed the employer's layoff procedures with rank
and file employees. 27 The foremen alleged wrongful discharge28 based upon
their exercise of free speech rights protected by the Illinois and United States
Constitutions. In rejecting their claims, the court reasoned that the mere
recitation of a constitutional provision does not establish a clear mandate of
public policy. Instead, the court examined the First Amendment and held that it
represents a public policy against government interference with speech. The
court held that because the Constitution limits only government, it cannot
provide a public policy basis in a wrongful discharge action involving a
private-sector employer.29
25 Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 837-43 (1982). The employer was a private
nonprofit school providing special education services to students placed there by
Massachusetts public schools. Id. at 831-32. The employer fired five teachers after they
wrote a letter to the editor of a local paper protesting certain policies regarding the student
council, which had become a matter of public debate and local concern. Id. at 835. The
teachers alleged only constitutional violations, so the Court never addressed the wrongful
discharge issue. Id. at 837. In NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 193-99 (1988), the
Court refused to consider due process claims in the absence of state action holding that the
NCAA's participation in UNLV's suspension of Coach Tarkanian did not constitute state
action.
26 478 N.E.2d 1354 (il. 1985).
27 Id. at 1355.
28 They cited Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 384 N.E.2d 353 (11. 1978), in which the
Illinois Supreme Court recognized a cause of action for retaliatory discharge when the
employer dismisses the employee in violation of a clearly mandated public policy. Id. at
357. Later, in Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 878 (Ill. 1981),
the court held it would find a clear mandate of public policy "in the state's constitution and
statutes and, when they are silent, in its judicial decisions."
29 Barr v. Kelso-Burnett Co., 478 N.E.2d 1354, 1356-57; accord, Rozier v. St.
Mary's Hosp., 411 N.E.2d 50, 54 (il. Ct. App. 1980) (holding that hospital employee
failed to state cause of action for dismissal in violation of her First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights to free speech because hospital was private and therefore termination
involved no state action); Chin v. AT&T, 410 N.Y.S.2d 737, 740 (Sup. Ct. 1978) (mem.)
(holding that employee failed to state a cause of action when he alleged discharge due to his
political beliefs, activities and associations), aft'd, 416 N.Y.S.2d 160 (App. Div. 1979)
(mem.). The court declined to reach the issue in Schultz v. Industrial Coils, Inc., 373
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Similarly, in Shovelin v. Central New Mexico Electrical Cooperative, Inc.,
the court rejected an employee's claim that the employer wrongfully discharged
him upon his election as mayor.30 The court held that neither the state
constitutional guarantee of free speech nor various statutes protecting the right
to vote afforded a public policy exception to the employment at will doctrine to
the new mayor;31 but rather that a private employee's freedom of political
expression was not a clearly mandated public policy.32
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals eloquently stated the minority view in
Novosel v. Nationwide Insurance Co.33 John Novosel had worked for
N.W.2d 74, 75-77 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985). While reserving judgment on whether the First
Amendment could provide a clear mandate of public policy in other cases, the court held
that a trial court properly dismissed an employee's complaint when the employee had
engaged in disruptive speech highly critical of the employer. The employee had written a
letter to the local newspaper critical of the company and several of its officers. In a similar
case, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that an insurance agent, an independent
contractor, had no cause of action under civil rights conspiracy laws when the insurer
unilaterally terminated the relationship because the agent was the fundraiser for a
congressional candidate whom the insurer did not support Gill v. Farm Bureau Life Ins.
Co., 906 F.2d 1265, 1266-70 (8th Cir. 1990). The court reasoned that there is no
constitutional right to be a fundraiser for a political candidate free from private pressure. Id.
at 1271. The court intimated that economic coercion of political choices is business as usual
in the United States. The court also revisited an analogue to Bell v. Faulkner, 75 S.W.2d
612 (Mo. C. App. 1934). It examined the agency contract, and determined that the
insurance company could terminate the agreement at any time. Therefore, there was no
harm done to the plaintiff. Id. at 1269-70. This decision is consistent with Bellamy v.
Mason's Stores, Inc., 508 F.2d 504, 506 (4th Cir. 1974), in which the court held that an
employee who alleged that he was fired because he was a member of the Ku Klux Klan
failed to state a cause of action under a civil rights statute because there was no involvement
of government in the alleged conspiracy.
30 Shovelin v. Central N.M. Elec. Coop., Inc., 850 P.2d 996 (N.M. 1993).
31 Id. at 1009-10.
32 Id. at 1010.
33 721 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1983). The case involved application of Pennsylvania law.
Some years later, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the Third Circuit had
misconstrued the law. Paul v. Lankenau Hosp., 569 A.2d 348 (Pa. 1990). The decision thus
has no binding effect, and it has not been widely followed. Shaitelman v. Phoenix Mutual
Life Ins. Co., 517 F. Supp. 21, 24 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) suggests that New York would
recognize an action for wrongful discharge derived from New York constitutional law and
cites for that proposition Chin v. AT&T, 410 N.Y.S.2d 737 (Sup. Ct. 1978) (mem.), aft'd,
416 N.Y.S.2d 160 (App. Div. 1979) (mem.). See also Kovalesky v. A.M.C. Associated
Merchandising Corp., 551 F. Supp. 544 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Brink's, Inc. v. City of New
York, 533 F. Supp. 1123, 1125 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). However, in Boniuk v. New York
Medical College, 535 F. Supp. 1353, 1355-56 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd., 714 F.2d 111 (2d Cir.
1982), the court held that there is no such cause of action in New York. For an example of
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Nationwide for fifteen years, had never been disciplined, and had a good
employment record. In October 1981, Nationwide circulated a memorandum
through all of its offices directing employees to sign a petition to the
Pennsylvania House of Representatives supporting no-fault insurance reform. 34
Novosel would not sign the petition and privately stated opposition to the
company's political stand. Nationwide fired him; he brought suit alleging
wrongful discharge in retaliation for his exercise of freedom of speech
protected by the state and federal constitutions. The federal district court
dismissed the complaint, reasoning that an employee relinquishes or waives
otherwise valid constitutional rights when he or she voluntarily engages in
employment. 35
The Third Circuit reversed this decision and directed a trial. Glossing over
the state action issue, the court held that the First Amendment represents a
cognizable expression of public policy for purposes of Novosel's wrongful
discharge claim against a private-sector employer. 36 The court adopted
Illinois's "definition of a 'clearly mandated public policy' as one that 'strikes at
the heart of a citizen's right, duties and responsibilities. . .. '" 37 The court
then looked to cases concerning public employees' First Amendment rights to
support its finding of public policy. 38
Novosel has been widely criticized. 39 Very few courts have indicated
how Novosel affected the debate on employment at will, see William B. Gould, The Rights
of Individual Workers, CENTER MAGAZNE, July/Aug. 1984, at 2, 8-9.
34 Novosel, 721 F.2d at 896.
35 Id. at 898.
36 Id. at 899-90.
37 Id. at 899 (quoting Palmateer v. International Harvester Inc., 421 N.E.2d 876, 878-
79 (IM. 1981). In Novosel the parties settled the case after the federal district court denied
the employer's motion for summary judgment on remand. Novosel v. Nationwide Mut. Ins.
Co., 118 L.R.R1M. (BNA) 2779, 2782 (W.D. Pa. 1985) (denying summary judgment on
all but one count).
38 Novosel, 721 F.2d at 900.
39 Novosel has been described as the most far-reaching extension of the public policy
doctrine and as a dramatic break with precedent because prior cases had unanimously
required that government action be present in order for a constitutional violation to exist.
DANIEL WEsTMAN, WHsTLEBLowiNG: THE LAW OF RETAuATORY DISCHARGE 95 (1991).
Professor Henry Perritt acknowledges that there may be "a conceptual path for imposing on
private employers the obligation not to dismiss employees for exercising their free speech
and associational rights outside the workplace .... ." HENRY H. PEiU , JR., EMPLOYEE
DIsMssAL LAw AND PRACrICE 183 (1987). In addition, Perritt compares Novosel to the
classic, early wrongful discharge case, Nees v. Hocks, 536 P.2d 512, 516-17 (Or. 1975),
in which the court relied in part on the state constitutional right to jury trial to protect an
employee dismissed for engaging in jury service. However, Perritt states that the precedent
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willingness to recognize a retaliatory discharge tort relying on the Constitution
for a statement of public policy. 4o The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has
indirectly indicated that Novosel does not represent Pennsylvania law;41as a
result, the Third Circuit has declined to extend the rule of Novosel to cases in
which there is no state action. 42
for such an application is weak, probably because it generally is agreed that the Constitution
does not protect persons against purely private conduct. PERRIT, supra, at 182. Perritt
characterizes Novosel as greatly expanding the range of public policies upon which tort
claims can be based. Henry H. Perritt, Jr., The Future of Wrongfd Dismissal Claims:
Where Does Employer SelfInterest Lie?, 58 U. CN. L. REv. 397, 402-03 (1989).
40 E.g., Parner v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 652 P.2d 625 (Haw. 1982) (remanding for
trial employee's claim that employer fired her to prevent her from testifying before a grand
jury); Chavez v. Manville Prod. Corp., 777 P.2d 371, 372, 375-78 & n.1 (N.M. 1989)
(remanding for trial case in which plaintiff alleged discharge was in retaliation for his
protest of employer's using plaintiff's name in employer's political lobbying effort, and in
which employer failed to raise as an issue on appeal lower court's finding of public policy);
Nees v. Hocks, 536 P.2d 512, 516 (Or. 1975) (holding that employee allegedly dismissed
for serving on jury stated a cause of action for wrongful discharge because Oregon
Constitution provides a right to jury trial in civil cases, and provides for jury service); Jones
v. Memorial Hosp. Sys., 677 S.W.2d 221, 224-25 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984) (ruling that nurse
stated cause of action for retaliatory discharge when she alleged that a hospital fired her for
her publication of an article critically describing the conflict between the wishes of the
terminally ill and their attending physicians).
41 In Paul v. Lankenau Hosp., 569 A.2d 346, 348 (Pa. 1990), the court held that "this
Court did not announce a cause of action for wrongful discharge" in Geary v. United States
Steel Corp., 319 A.2d 174 (1974). The Court in Paul emphasized the narrowness of any
exception to the doctrine of employment at will in Pennsylvania. Paul, 569 A.2d at 348.
42 The Third Circuit had an opportunity to extend Novosel in a case in which an
employee alleged that her private employer's drug-testing program violated her right to
privacy and right to freedom from unreasonable searches under the Fourth Amendment.
Borse v. Piece Goods Shop, Inc., 963 F.2d 611, 613, 620 (3d Cir. 1992). The court
declined to do so, concluding that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would not look to the
First and Fourth Amendments as sources of public policy when there is no state action. Id.
at 620. Nevertheless, the court did not overrule Novosel, and it cited favorably a number of
Pennsylvania lower-court decisions that used the state or federal constitutions as evidence of
public policy together with other statutory provisions. Id. at 619 (citing Hunter v. Port
Auth., 419 A.2d 631 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980) (finding cause of action in case involving state
action, in which a job applicant was denied employment because of assault conviction for
which he had been pardoned under Art. I, § 1 of Pennsylvania Constitution) and Reuther v.
Fowler & Williams, Inc., 386 A.2d 119, 120-21 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978) (holding that
employee dismissed for serving on a jury stated cause of action for wrongful discharge
based upon jury statute and Pennsylvania constitutional guarantee of trial by jury)). In Waas
v. Colonial Penn Group, Inc., 125 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 57,369 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (citing
Borse), the court declined to follow Novosel, holding that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
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Several courts have used a state statute protecting rights of political activity
or expression as a basis for public policy in a wrongful discharge case. In Gay
Law Students Ass'n v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co.,43 California
Supreme Court Justice Tobriner, writing for the majority, held that the
employer discriminated against homosexuals in the hiring, firing, and
promotion of employees and that this conduct violated a state statute prohibiting
employers from controlling or directing the political activities or affiliations of
employees. 44 The court analogized the struggle for gay rights to the continuing
struggle for civil rights waged by blacks, women, and minorities. 45 In Davis v.
Louisiana Computing Corp.,46 the court held that an employee stated a cause of
action for wrongful discharge when he alleged that he was fired because he
became a candidate for political office and when a state statute provided that
employers may not prevent employees from participating in politics.47 Many
states have statutory provisions addressing the right to vote or participate in the
political process.48 A number of states also protect an employee from an
would not look to the First Amendment as a source of public policy when there is no state
action. See also, Brown v. Hammond, 810 F. Supp. 644, 646-47 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (citing
Novosel favorably but not following it). For an interesting discussion of the early dialogue
between the state and federal courts on this issue, see Mark R. Kramer, Comment, The
Role of Federal Couns in Changing State Law: The Employment at Will Doctrine in
Pennsylvania, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 227 (1984).
43 595 P.2d 592 (Cal. 1979).
44 Id. at 610 (citing CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1101-02 (West 1989) and Lockheed Aircraft
Corp. v. Superior Court, 171 P.2d 21 (Cal. 1946)).
45Id.
46 394 So. 2d 678 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 400 So. 2d 668 (La. 1981).
47 Id. at 679 (applying LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23:961 (West 1985)).
48 Federal law prohibits "attempts to intimidate, threaten, or coerce [ ]any other person
for the purpose of interfering with the right.., to vote" for a candidate for federal office.
18 U.S.C. § 594 (1988). Federal law also prohibits expenditures to influence voting, that is,
soliciting, receiving, or accepting an expenditure in consideration of a vote or withholding a
vote. 18 U.S.C. § 597 (1988). Federal law prohibits promises and threats in connection with
employment made possible by an act of Congress in exchange for political activity. 18
U.S.C. §§ 600-01 (1988). State laws generally prohibit buying and selling votes, that is,
giving or taking something of value in exchange for a promise to vote a certain way, and
many also prohibit threats or coercion to influence voting. ALA. CODE §§ 17-23-4 to -5
(1988); ALASKA STAT. § 15.56.030 (1988); ARZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-1014 (1984);
ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-1-104(4) (Michie 1993); CAL. ELEC. CODE § 29622 (West 1989);
CoLo. REv. STAT. § 1-13-303 (1986); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9-364a (West 1989);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 8006 (1993); D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-1318(b)(3) (1992); FLA.
STAT. ANN. §§ 104.045, 104.061 (West 1992); GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-570 (Michie 1993);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 19-3 (1) to (3) (1985); IDAHO CODE §§ 18-2305, 18-2320 (1987); ILL.
CoMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 10, paras. 5/29-1 to 5/29-3 (Smith-Hurd 1993); IND. CODE ANN.
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employer's attempt to influence the employee's vote by threats, intimidation, or
other forms of coercion.49 Only one state, Connecticut, has a statute creating a
private right of action for employees who are fired by private-sector employers
in retaliation for their exercise of First Amendment rights.50
§ 3-14-3-20 (West 1988); IowA CODE ANN. § 722.4 (West 1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-
409 (1986); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 119.205(1)-(3) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1993); LA.
REV. SrAT. ANN. § 14:119 (West 1986); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 602 (West
1983 & Supp. 1993); MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. § 24-2(7) (1993); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 56,
§ 32 (Law. Co-op. 1990); MIcI. COMp. LAws ANN. § 168.931(a)-(c) (West 1989); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 211B.13 (West 1992); MISS. CODE ANN. § 23-15-889 (1990); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 115.635(1), (6) (Vernon 1980); MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-35-214 (1993); NEB. REV.
SrAT. § 32-1209 (1988); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 293.700 (Michie 1990); N.H. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 640:2 (1986); N.J. ANN. STAT. § 19:34-25 (West 1989); N.M. SrAT. ANN.
§ 1-20-11, -12 (Michie 1991); N.Y. ELEc. LAw § 17-142 (McKinney 1978); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 163-275(2) (Supp. 1993); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-14-03 (1985); Omo REv.
CODE ANN. § 3599.01, .02 (Anderson 1988); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 16-106 (West
1991); OR. REv. STAT. § 260.665 (1991); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 3539 (1963); R.I.
GEN. LAws § 17-23-5 (1988); S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-25-60 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993); S.D.
CODIFmD LAws ANN. § 12-26-15 (1982); TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-19-126 (1985); TEX.
PENAL CODE ANN. § 36.02 (West 1989 & Supp. 1994); UTAH CODE ANN. § 20-13-1, -2
(1991); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2017 (1982); VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-1007 (Michie
1993); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 29.85.090 (West 1993); W. VA. CODE § 3-9-12, -16
(1990); WIS. SrAT. ANN. § 12.09, .11 (West 1986 & Supp. 1993); WYO. STAT. § 22-26-
109 (1992).
49 ALA. CODE § 17-23-10 (1991); ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 16-1012 (1984); CAL.
LAB. CODE § 1101 (West 1989); CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-2-108 (West 1986); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51q (West 1987); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 104.081 (West 1992); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 49.110 (West 1991); KY. REV. SrAT. ANN. § 121.310 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill
1993); MD. CODE ANN. ELEc., § 26-16(a)(6) (1993); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 56, § 33
(Law. Co-op. 1990); MIcH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 168.931(d) (West 1989); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 211B.15(16) (West 1992 & Supp. 1994); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 23-15-871, 79-1-9
(1990); Mo. ANN. REv. STAT. § 115.637(6) (Vernon Supp. 1993); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 13-35-226 (1993); NEB. REv. STAT. § 32-1223 (1988); NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 613.040
(Michie 1992); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:34-27 (West 1989); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-20-13
(Michie 1991); N.Y. ELEc. LAw § 17-150 (McKinney 1978); Omo REv. CODE ANN.
§ 3599.06 (Anderson 1988); R.I. GEN. LAws § 17-23-6 (1988); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§ 12-26-12 (1982); TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-19-135 (Supp. 1993); UTAH CODE ANN. § 20-13-
7 (1991); W. VA. CODE § 3-8-11(d) (1990); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 12.07 (West 1986 & Supp.
1993); WYo. STAT. § 22-26-116 (1992).
50 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51q (West 1987). The legislative history of this law
reveals little, except for a general recognition that, "Whether you know it or not, right now,
you do not have certain rights of freedom of speech in terms of your employment." 1983
CONN. GEN. ASSEMBLY HousE PRoc. 5312 (1983) (statement of Rep. Shays). See generally
1983 CoNN. GEN. ASSEMBLY HousE PRoc. 5288-323, 9090-93 (1983); 1983 CONN. GEN.
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In response to judicial recognition of the wrongful discharge tort, some
states have considered or enacted a wrongful termination statute.51 In addition,
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws adopted the
Model Employment Termination Act (META) in 1991.52 The META provides
that an employer may not terminate an employee without "good cause" 53 and
defines good cause as
(i) a reasonable basis related to an individual employee for termination of the
employee's employment in view of relevant factors and circumstances, which
may include the employee's duties, responsibilities, conduct on the job or
otherwise, job performance, and employment record, or (ii) the exercise of
business judgment in good faith by the employer, including setting its
economic or institutional goals and determining methods to achieve those
goals, organizing or reorganizing operations, discontinuing, consolidating, or
divesting operations or positions or parts of operations or positions,
determining the size of its work force and the nature of the positions filled by
its work force, and determining and changing standards of performance for
positions.54
Professor St. Antoine reports that the drafters intended a standard similar to
that of just cause in a collective bargaining agreement; 55 how broadly courts
will construe the "good cause" definition remains an open question. Courts
presumably would construe this language to prohibit dismissal in retaliation for
ASSEMBLY SENATE PRoc. 3596-604, 3721, 3757, 4408-10, 4665-66 (1983).
51 E.g., MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-901-915 (1993); OR. REV. STAT. § 659.035
(Supp. 1992); see also WESTMAN, supra note 39 at 183-87 (summarizing state statutes);
Alan B. Krueger, The Evolution of Unjust-Dismissal Legislation in the United States, 44
INDus. & LAB. REL. REv. 644, 651-52 (1991) (summarizing proposed state statutes).
52 MODEL EMPLOYmENT TERMINATION Acr (1991). These developments promise to
reduce the costs to employers of wrongful discharge litigation by diverting these cases to
binding arbitration. See William B. Gould IV, Stemming the Wrongfid Discharge Y7de: A
Case for Arbitration, 13 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 404 (1988); Michelle Laque Johnson,
Arbitrators Helo to Ot Workers Lawsuits: Some Companies Favor Neutral Third Parties to
Give Employees 'Day in Court,' INVFsTOR's DAILY, Jan. 8, 1990, at 1.
5 3 MoDEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION Acr § 3 (a) (1991).
54 Id. § 1(4).
55 Theodore J. St. Antoine, The Model Employment Termination Act: Fairness for
Employees and Employers Alike, 43 LAB. L.J. 495, 498 (1992). Professor St. Antoine
served as reporter for the drafting committee of the Uniform Law Commissioners. Id. at
496. Arbitrators tend not to distinguish between "cause" and "just cause." See FRANK
ELKoum & EDNA AsPER ELKoui, How ARBrTRATION WORKS, 652-53 (4th ed. 1985). For
a critical view of META, see Paul H. Tobias, Defects in the Model Employment
Termination Act, 43 LAB. L.J. 500 (1992).
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conduct protected by a substantial public policy; the statute probably
incorporates the existing case law and provides some protection from wholly
arbitrary dismissal. However, it does not expressly protect an employee from
dismissal for off-the-job political activity or speech with which the employer
disagrees.
III. THE CASE FOR USING THE FIRST AMENDMENT AS A SOURCE OF
PUBLIC POLICY
In 1967, Professor Lawrence Blades published an influential article laying
out the argument for judicial intervention in light of the growing unequal
bargaining power between employer and employee.56 If anything, the
arguments for the tort are even stronger in light of a number of factors that
decrease employees' mobility, specifically a long-term economic recession,5 7
56 Lawrence E. Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the
Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. Rav. 1404 (1967); see also, Clyde W.
Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Disnissal: Tme for a Statute, 62 VA. L.
REV. 481 (1976) (also widely cited by courts recognizing the tort). Blades argued that the
ever-increasing concentration of economic power in fewer employers and the comparative
immobility of employees in the face of increasing job specialization rendered the old
common law rule of employment at will obsolete. He reasoned that concern over job
security renders employees vulnerable to inappropriate employer coercion. Blades, supra,
at 1405. Blades pointed out that 500 corporations controlled two-thirds of the nonfarm
economy. Id. at 1404 n.1. In 1991 gross domestic product was $5,677.5 billion, and the
nonfarm economy $4,702.8 billion. BUREAU OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIs, U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, SuRv. OF CURRENT Bus. 5, table 1.7 (1992). The Fortune 500's gross sales in
1991 were $2,263 billion. Alison Rogers & Ricardo Sookdeo, The Fortune 500 Largest
U.S. Industrial Corporations: It was the Worst of Years, FORTUNE, Apr. 20, 1992, at 212,
213. Thus, during a recession the Fortune 500 controls approximately 40% of the total
economy and slightly more than 40 % of the nonfarm economy. Although the economy has
become more decentralized, the Fortune 500 still employs a significant proportion of all
workers. In 1991, the Fortune 500 employed almost 12 million employees. Id. Government
in 1990 employed over 18 million people (full-time and part-time including state, federal,
and local government). BUREAU OF THE CENSUs, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, PUBLIC
EMPLOYMENT v (1990). Government employees enjoy the protection of the First
Amendment, while their private counterparts do not As of 1989, only 18.6% of all full-
time wage and salary workers were represented by a union. This figure represents a decline
from 23.3% in 1983. BUREAU OF LABOR STATtSTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,
EMPLOYMENT & EARNINGS 228 (Jan. 1991).
57 Household moving rates drop during a recession. The annual rate of moving has
fallen from 21% to 18% since the 1950s, and the overwhelming majority of these are
renters. In general, people fear losing their jobs, and this contributes to the lower moving
rate. Pamela Reeves, Americans Still Moving, but Not as Much as in the '50s and '60s,
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the deepening health care problem, 58 and the advent of two-career families. 59
Corporations have increasing influence on external political issues.60 It
STAR TRuNE, Jan. 4, 1992, at 2R; Carrie Teegardin, Harder imes Keep Americans From
Loading up the Moving Van, ATLANTA CONSTrrTrION, Feb. 26, 1992, at Al.
58 A recent survey indicates that 20 % of Americans say they or a family member are
locked in their jobs because new work offers limited or no health insurance. One in Five
American Families Victim of "Job Lock:" High Cost and Lack of Insurance Top Reasons,
Business Wire, Oct. 15, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, BWIRE File. The survey
was conducted by Lou Harris and the Kaiser Foundation. Of the 20% reporting job lock,
35% said the cost of insurance at the new job was too high, 30% reported that the new job
offered no health insurance, 11% reported that the new job offered no coverage for
dependents, and 4% reported problems with pre-existing conditions that would not be
covered. Id. A California survey reported that one in four survey respondents did not
change jobs because of health insurance. Susan Moffat, Health Care vs. Job Mobility: Many
Workers Stay on out of Fear of Losing Medical Benefits, L.A. TNES, Aug. 20, 1992, at D1;
Benefits Keep Californians Tied to Their Jobs, Survey Finds, BNA Pensions & Benefits
Daily, Aug. 24, 1992, availabe in LEXIS, News Library, BNAPEN File.
59 It takes two salaries and careers to maintain the standard of living that one salary
financed in the 50s and 60s. Two-thirds of all U.S. households now consist of two or more
wage earners. Often, the employee who wants to change jobs must take into consideration
the trailing spouse, or spouse who will also need a new job if the family relocates. One
study found that 90% of all trailing spouses suffered a career setback when their spouses
were relocated. This can mean a net reduction in family income that can deter families from
relocating. New Study Indicates Spousal Relocation Assistance Can Prevent Downward
Mobility in Job Changes, PR Newswire, Feb. 1, 1990, available in LEXIS, News Library,
PRNEWS File. Another survey showed that in 1990, 37% of those surveyed were reluctant
to relocate because their spouses did not wish to leave their jobs, up 7% from 1989. Kathie
Eynon, Trailing Spouses: Firms are Making Effort to Place Better Halves, OAK.AND Bus.
MoNTmry Bus. DATELINE, Nov. 1990, at 63, available in LEXs, NEws Library, ARCNWS
File. See generally Don L. Boroughs et al., Love & Money, U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORT,
Oct. 19, 1992, at 54; Echo Montgomery Garrett, Some Trailing Spouses Drag Their Heels,
CpR's N.Y. Bus., Mar. 11, 1991, at 19, available in LEXIS, News Library, ARCNWS
File; More Women Relocated, Greater Assistance Offered for "Trailing Spouses," Bus.
WIRm, Apr. 30, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, BWIRE File.
60 Arthur S. Miller, The Corporation as a Private Government in the World
Community, 46 VA. L. REv. 1539 (1960); Charles A. Reich, The Individual Sector, 100
YALE L. REv. 1409 (1991); Clyde W. Summers, The Privatization of Personal Freedoms
and Enrichment of Democracy: Some Lessons from Labor Law, 1986 U. ILL. L. REv. 689
(1986). In his work, Atleson calls attention to the irony that the Supreme Court is increasing
limits on public fora and union speech at the very time that it has dramatically expanded the
area of protected corporate speech. Atleson, supra note 20, at 856-67. Even then-Associate
Justice Rehnquist dissented from the opinion holding corporations to be persons eligible for
full constitutional protection. First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (striking
down state statute limiting the use of corporate funds to influence a state referendum).
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would appear that the willingness of corporate employers to influence external
political affairs has grown with their legal right to do so. 61 Not only have
corporations achieved personhood under the Constitution, but they have also
acquired a powerful new tool for influencing political affairs: the corporate
political action committee or PAC. 62 Prior to 1975, corporations had no right
to make political contributions. The 1971 amendments 63 to the Federal Election
Campaign Act (FECA) empowered corporations for the first time to create
corporate PACs. Initial interpretations of the new law permitted corporations to
solicit stockholders and administrative and managerial employees for voluntary
contributions to the PAC. Once such contributions are made, the donor has no
say in how they are spent. However, in a 1975 Advisory Opinion to the Sun
Oil Co., 64 the Federal Election Commission permitted corporations to assume
the full expenses of running the PAC under FECA, to create multiple PACs to
get around contribution limits, and to hire employees to engage in political
fundraising fulltime. The decision led to an explosion in corporate political
advertising. 65 These businesses may now expend unlinited amounts of money
to produce written solicitations and advertise particular political views,
provided they include a line welcoming donations to the PAC.66
Professor Thomas I. Emerson expressed concern over the need to protect free expression
from infringement by "private centers of power." THOMAS I. EmERSON, THE SYsTEM OF
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 675-96 (1970).
61 For a quantitative analysis showing the growth of corporate political action
committees, see HAROLD W. STANLEY & RPCHARD G. NEMI, VrrAL STATISTICS ON
AMEmcAN POLmcs 158-74 (1990).
62 Much of this discussion is drawn from an invaluable contribution to the literature on
corporate PACs, DAN CLAWSON Er AL., MONEY TALKS: COR'ORATE PACS AND POLmCAL
INFLUENcE 27-52 (1992).
63 Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1971).
64 Establishment of Political Action Committee and Employee Political Giving
Program by Corporation, Federal Election Commission, 40 Fed. Reg. 56,584 (1975).
65 CLAWSON, supra note 62, at 12-13.
66 See generally Benjamin M. Vandegrift, The Corporate Political Action Committee,
55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 422 (1980). The author observes:
Perhaps most bizarre, however, is the overall economic effect of the system.
While the Act limits the amount of financial resources that corporations may direct to
partisan political activity, it also provides a means by which corporations may control
the flow of individual campaign contributions. A corporation is prohibited from
contributing to political campaigns directly. It is permitted, however, to devote
unlimited resources in the form of in-kind contributions to obtaining from shareholders
and employees, through PAC solicitations, funds that management may then earmark
for the candidates of its choice. Assuming there are limits on the amount of money that
individual voters are willing to devote to political campaigning, contributions to PAC
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In addition, corporations may solicit managerial and administrative
employees with few limitations; they do so aggressively. 67 In recent years,
corporate PACs have engaged in a practice called "bundling." The PAC
collects individual contributions to specific candidates from corporate middle
and upper management. The PAC then puts the checks together in a bundle, in
an envelope from the PAC, and the PAC representative hands these
"individual" contributions directly to the candidate. 68 Under federal law, the
funds represent money that might otherwise be contributed to candidates directly by
individuals. Thus, a PAC may operate to concentrate campaign contributions under the
control of corporate management, a perverse effect if decentralizing financial political
influence is a goal.
Id. at 470.
67 See generally Kenneth A. Gross, The Corporate PAC: Should We PAC It In?, 34
FED. B. NEws & J. 63 (1987). Gross reports that almost three-quarters of all corporate
PACs surveyed solicit senior executives, and almost two-thirds solicit middle management.
Id. He also reports:
Some have argued that solicitation of corporate management is inherently
coercive. While claims of inherent coercion are largely unsubstantiated, PAC managers
may view funding of the PAC as "a cost of doing business," with a specific budget,
expecting either a fixed amount or percentage of salary from corporate executives. This
type of thinking can lead to problems. Whether an executive contributes and how much
he or she contributes must be voluntary. The solicitation may suggest how much to
contribute, but it can only be presented as a guideline. Problems may ensue if the
request for funds does not expressly state that the contribution is voluntary and that the
executive may decline to contribute.
Id. at 63-64 (footnote omitted). Gross cites a case in which a bank president sent a memo to
all the vice presidents, urging them to contribute: "Every single officer of this institution
should-must-consider it a part of his or her position to contribute" to both of his
designated PACs. Id. at 64; see also Bernadette A. Budde, Bsiness-Related Political Action
Committees-A Permanent Force After One Decade, 3 J.L. & PoL. 449, 456 n.7 (1987)
(reporting that 88% of all managerial and executive personnel are solicited directly by
PACs). Budde stresses the importance and usefulness to business of the PAC and expresses
concern that with shrinking managerial ranks through layoffs and reductions in force,
potential sources of PAC funds are drying up. Id. at 456. Obviously, with declining
numbers, there will be added incentive for corporate PACs to become more aggressive
about collecting from the managerial employees who remain, and those employees likely
will feel vulnerable to pressure for fear of losing their jobs.
68 Sara Fritz, "HowLawmakers Get TheirBundle, " L.A. TIMS, July 1, 1992, at A18.
The author reports that the New York investment banking firm Goldman, Sachs & Co.
contributed nearly $450,000 to congressional candidates during the 1990 election, most of it
through individual contributions and bundling. Corporate PACs were the biggest overall
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corporate PAC may solicit employees as frequently as twice a year for
donations, provided it informs the employees that donations are voluntary.69
From 1974 to 1988, the number of corporate PACs grew from 89 to
1,816, while during the same period, the number of labor union PACs grew
from 201 to 354.70 Corporate PAC political contributions were lower than
labor union contributions in the 1977-78 election cycle, but as of 1987-88
were 26% higher than those of labor unions; between 1977-78 and 1987-88,
corporate PAC spending increased 586%.71
Unions challenged the voluntariness of contributions solicited by employer
PACs in International Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. FEC,72
but the court ruled that there was no cognizable violation of employees First
Amendment rights. The Commission reasoned that the Act merely authorized
contributors during the 1992 campaign. Tim Curran, PACs Increase Donations by 10%
over 92, Giving 82% of their Money to Incumbents, ROLL CALL, Sept. 17, 1992, at 2,
available in LEas, News Library CURNWS file.
69 Employers may solicit employees and their families twice a year, provided they do
so in a written solicitation mailed to the employee's residence, and provided that
contributions are mailed to an independent third-party custodian to preserve the anonymity
of noncontributing employees. Vandegrift, supra note 66, at 463-64. However, employers
must report the names of any employees who make contributions of $50 or more, and this
requirement defeats the effort to maintain anonymity. Id. at 465. The employer will learn
the names of all employees who refuse to contribute at least $50, although among those
employees, the employer will be unable to determine who contributed less than $50 and
who contributed nothing. Id.
70 STANLEY & NIEM, supra note 61, at 160. Corporate PACs represented
approximately 43% of the total number of PACs as of 1988 (1,816 out of 4,268). By
contrast, in 1974, corporate PACs represented approximately 15% of the total (89 out of
608). Id.
71 Id. at 163. Specifically, in 1977-78, corporate PACs spent $15.2 million, while
labor PACs spent $18.6 million. By 1987-88, corporate PACs spent $89 million, while
labor PACs spent $70.4 million. It is interesting to note that while contributions increased,
voter turnout declined until the 1992 presidential election. From 1976 through 1988, voter
turnout in presidential elections declined from 54.4% to 50.2%. CoNmREssIoNAL
QUARTERLY, INC., THE PEOPLE SPEAK: AMmCAN ELEcrIoNS IN Focus 229 (Ann Davies
ed. 1990). See generally BUREAU oF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COM. Tm DECLINE IN
AMEICAN VoTER TuRuour (1991); WARREN E. MILLER & SANTA TAuorr, AMEUcAN
NATIONAL ELECrioN STUDiEs DATA SOURCEBOOK, 1952-1986 (1989). In the 1992
presidential election, voter turnout increased to 55% based upon preliminary estimates.
David G. Savage, High Voter Turnout Reverses 32-Year Slide, L.A. TIMEs, Nov. 5, 1992,
at A36. However, that turnout is still lower than the turnout in 1972, which was 55.4%, and
significantly lower than the turnout in 1960, which was 63.1%. CONGREssIONAL
QUARTERLY, INC., supra, at 229.
72 678 F.2d 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1981), aft'd, 459 U.S. 983 (1982) (mem.).
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the solicitation; it did not compel contribution.73 Thus, even assuming there is
state action, the mere fact of solicitation in the employment setting does not
establish an inference of coercion. It is well documented that corporate PACs
can buy political access, and influence the outcome of legislation, in ways with
which individual employee contributors would strongly disagree.74 However,
corporate PACs are unique in that employers have the power to penalize
employees who fail to contribute. One study showed that while employers
would rarely admit to taking direct action against an employee for a refusal to
contribute, the employer would consider such refusal as one factor influencing
the employee's evaluation. 75 Thus, there is a powerful incentive for corporate
employers to solicit contributions from employees and very few limits on
precisely how they do so.76 This development has occurred only since 1975,
well after Professor Blades's groundbreaking article.77 Recent commentators
have emphasized the moral argument for the remedy: employees often work
decades for the same employer and come to rely on that employment in unique
ways distinct from the relationship of employer and casual or temporary
employee. 78
As part of the research supported by the Fund for Labor Relations Studies,
the Indiana University Center for Survey Research was commissioned to
conduct a random telephone survey (the Indiana Poll)79 during the weeks
surrounding the 1992 presidential election. Interviewers first established
73 Id. at 1111-12, 1115.
74 CLAwsoN, supra note 62, at 88-119; see also Budde, supra note 67.
75 CLAWSON, supra note 62, at 38.
76 There are penalties for employers who coerce contributions to a PAC (up to a
$5,000 fine and one year in prison, under 2 U.S.C. § 269 (1988)), but the employee has no
private cause of action. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 82-83 (1975) (holding that FECA
does not create private cause of action for shareholders alleging corporate expenditures in
federal election campaign). In general, federal courts have been reluctant to recognize a
federal wrongful discharge tort and have even held that the states have no interest in
enforcing public policies stemming from federal law. See, e.g., Adler v. American Standard
Corp., 830 F.2d 1303, 1306-07 (4th Cir. 1987) (holding that under Maryland law
employee failed to state a cause of action when he alleged he was fired for stating he
intended to disclose the employer's illegal kickback scheme); Rachford v. Evergreen Int'l
Airlines, 596 F. Supp. 384, 385-86 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (holding that under Illinois law
employee failed to state a cause of action when he alleged he was fired for reporting
employer violations to the FAA).
77 See Blades, supra note 56.
78 WEmM, supra note 6, at 68.
79 Indiana Poll 20A, Unofficial Responses to Interviewers Questions (1992)
(questioning employees about their work environment) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with the Ohio State Law Journal).
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whether respondents had worked within the private-sector in the past twelve
months. If so, interviewers asked respondents the following question: "At any
time over the past twelve months, have you ever felt that your employer
wanted you to support a particular political stand, party, group, or candidate?"
Seven percent of 585 people surveyed answered in the affirmative. When asked
to elaborate, they supplied varying explanations, a selection of which follows:
My boss is a die-hard Republican. I don't know if he's ever tried to sway
me, but every time the topic pops up he's very adamant in his beliefs.
[My] employer is running for District 17 of Indiana.
They gave out brochures telling us to support certain candidates and
certain parties.
They're a union and they support certain areas of politics.
I work in the medical field for a contract company. I do not think they
would want me to vote for any way that is going to change the medical field as
it now exists. I am obviously going to vote the opposite of how they would
have me to vote.
It was a certain bill before Congress. We were encouraged to phone and
send letters to both Senators and local Congressmen. It was the cable TV bill.
They even called a special meeting, had all the employees come in, gave a
handout sheet of all the Senators and Congressmen, [and] encouraged us to do
this. That's the only time it's ever happened, political dealing or something
like that.
Really just with my immediate supervisor-he just advises on a lot of the
issues and what they say.
Through PAC contributions.
By asking me who I was going to vote for and telling me how business
has been so bad and that Bill Clinton will make it worse.
They pretty much at each meeting tell you who they think you should vote
for and they pass out stickers and stuff. We get a local newspaper with their
choice of political parties on the front cover.80
Although no respondent reported losing a job, the survey indicated that
employers were making an effort to influence employee political views.
80 Id. Interviewees' oral responses remain in unedited form.
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In sum, there is a substantial potential for employers to abuse their power
over employees in the realm of political expression, and virtually no effective
counterbalancing remedy. In similar circumstances involving the exercise of an
individual employee right, courts have recognized a private right of action for
wrongful discharge.
IV. THE IMPLICIT CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEM
There is a substantial argument that state action triggers constitutional
protections when a state court rejects an employee's claim that a private
employer fired him or her in violation of the public policy embodied in the
First Amendment. The essence of this argument is that the state court's
decision itself provides the requisite government involvement. Although private
parties are not otherwise bound by constitutional protections, the judiciary may
not countenance the deprivation. In the tort of wrongful discharge, state courts
create classifications for protected and unprotected employee speech based on
the content of the speech. Some speech is protected by reference to an
important public policy, for example, reporting a crime; however, these courts
do not protect political speech. This section reviews the current law on state
action and argues that under current Supreme Court standards, a state court's
dismissal of a wrongful discharge complaint concerning free speech represents
state action.
The source of the state action requirement is in the language of the
Fourteenth Amendment: "[N]or shall any state deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law."81 The Supreme Court has
held that this language sets forth an "essential dichotomy... between
deprivation by the State, subject to scrutiny under its provisions, and private
conduct, 'however discriminatory or wrongful,' against which the Fourteenth
Amendment offers no shield."82 Although an act of a state legislature or
executive clearly provides state action, the doctrine also encompasses the acts
of the judicial branch. In Shelley v. Kraemer,83 the Court held that a state court
could not constitutionally enforce a racially restrictive covenant in a real estate
deed:
It has been recognized that the action of state courts in enforcing a substantive
common-law rule formulated by those courts, may result in the denial of rights
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, even though the judicial
81 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
82 Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349 (1974) (citing The Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) and quoting Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948)).
83 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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proceedings in such cases may have been in complete accord with the most
rigorous conceptions of procedural due process. 84
The Court cited as its authority for this holding two First Amendment cases,
one in which it had held that a state-court injunction against peaceful picketing
violated the right to freedom of discussion of labor union members8 5 and one
in which it had held that a state court violated the Free Exercise Clause when it
found certain religious practices to represent the common-law crime of breach
of the peace. 86
In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,87 the Court intervened when a state
court applied its common-law rules on libel and slander in a manner that
interfered with the First Amendment's protection of freedom of the press. An
Alabama public official had brought suit against the New York Times
Company for civil libel arising out of a paid advertisement published in the
Times at the behest of the Committee to Defend Martin Luther King and the
struggle for freedom in the South. The state court awarded the plaintiff half a
million dollars in damages, an award that the Alabama Supreme Court
upheld.88 The Court dismissed arguments that the Alabama courts had not
engaged in state action:
We may dispose at the outset of two grounds asserted to insulate the judgment
of the Alabama courts from constitutional scrutiny. The first is the proposition
relied on by the state supreme Court-that "The Fourteenth Amendment is
directed against state action and not private action." That proposition has no
application to this case. Although this is a civil lawsuit between private parties,
the Alabama courts have applied a state rule of law which petitioners claim to
impose invalid restrictions on their constitutional freedoms of speech and press.
It matters not that that law has been applied in a civil action and that it is
common law only, though supplemented by statute. The test is not the form in
which state power has been applied but, whatever the form, whether such
power has in fact been exercised. 89
In Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell,9° the Court did not even find it necessary
84 Id. at 17.
85 American Fed'n of Labor v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1941).
86 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
87 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
88 Id. at 256-63.
89 Id. at 265 (citing American Fed'n of Labor v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1941))
(citations omitted).
90 485 U.S. 46 (1988). The Court overturned a damage award that Jerry Falwell had
recovered from Hustler Magazine, Inc. for a political cartoon portraying him engaged in an
incestuous act with his mother in an outhouse. The entire opinion is devoted to the First
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to address the question of state action. The Court held that a state court could
not construe the common-law tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress
so as to interfere with the First Amendment freedom of the press. 91
The Court has also found state action when a state court authorizes a
private act that violates a provision of the Constitution. In Lugar v. Edmondson
Oil Co., Inc.,92 the Court found that the state acted jointly with a private
creditor to deprive the debtor of property without due process when a clerk of
the state court issued an exparte writ of attachment, which was executed by the
county sheriff.93 The Court adopted a two-part test for state action:
First, the deprivation must be caused by the exercise of some right or privilege
created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the State or by a person
for whom the State is responsible.... Second, the party charged with the
deprivation must be a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor. This
may be because he is a state official, because he has acted together with or has
obtained significant aid from state officials, or because his conduct is otherwise
chargeable to the state.94
Amendment limits on recovery for intentional infliction of emotional distress and follows the
framework of New York Imes Co. v. Sullivan.
91 Id. at 50-53.
92 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
93 Id. at 924, 939-42. The Court distinguished these facts from the facts of Flagg
Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978), in which it found no state action. In Flagg
Brothers, a New York law patterned on the Uniform Commercial Code allowed a
warehouseman to sell the property of its debtors; the law authorized self-help, but no public
official participated in the sale. The court held that this activity was private and not subject
to the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 155-66. In Lugar, the Court followed a line of cases
in which there was an implicit finding of state action because in each case the Court
subjected garnishment actions or prejudgment attachments to the standards of procedural
due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 927. In North Georgia
Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975), the Court struck down a
garnishment procedure as violating due process. The procedure permitted one private party
to a pending lawsuit to garnish another private party's wages by filing an affidavit with the
clerk of court. The clerk then issued the writ of garnishment, which could be dissolved only
by the filing of a bond. See also Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 601-20 (1974)
(execution of a vendor's lien); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 69-92 (1972) (holding
unconstitutional replevin statutes that permitted creditor to repossess goods sold on an
installment contract by getting the clerk of court to issue a writ to a sheriff at the creditor's
behest); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 337-42 (1969) (holding
unconstitutional a state statute that authorized garnishment of wages without notice and a
hearing).
94 Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937. The Court goes on to observe: "Without a limit such as
this, private parties could face constitutional litigation whenever they seek to rely on some
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Although the two requirements collapse into one when there is action by a
state official, they diverge when a constitutional claim is directed against a
private party. The Court reasoned that action by a private party in reliance on a
state statute, such as the Flagg Brothers case95 or the discriminatory
membership policies of a Moose Lodge under its liquor license,96 without
more, will not establish state action. The Court will look to a number of other
factors and tests depending upon the factual context.97
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.98 is the most recent statement of the
state action doctrine in the context of state courts. The case involved civil
litigation between private parties, specifically, a jury trial on a tort claim;
neither party to the lawsuit was a state actor. During voir dire, the defendant
exercised its rights under state law to exclude potential jurors using the
peremptory challenge by excluding three African American jurors solely on the
basis of race. Although the state court played no part in the defendant's
decision, the Supreme Court nevertheless found sufficient state action to trigger
Fourteenth Amendment protections, and held that the defendant's exclusion of
potential jurors solely on the basis of race violated the Equal Protection Clause.
The Court reasoned:
Although the conduct of private parties lies beyond the Constitution's scope in
most instances, governmental authority may dominate an activity to such an
extent that its participants must be deemed to act with the authority of the
government and, as a result, be subject to constitutional constraints.99
The Court then applied the Lugar1°° test. It held that peremptory challenges
result from the exercise of a right or privilege that has its source in state
authority because by their very nature they have no significance outside a court
state rule governing their interactions with the community surrounding them." Id.
95 See Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 164-66.
For an excellent critique of Flagg Brothers, see Paul Brest, State Action and Liberal
Theory: A Casenote on Flagg Brothers v. Brooks, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1296 (1982), part of
that volume's now classic symposium on the public-private distinction.
96 See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 171-77 (1972).
97 For example, the Court has looked at whether the private party performs a public
function. See generally Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966) (city park established by
private trust); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (private Democratic primaries); Marsh
v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (company town).
98 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991).
99 Id. at 2082.
100 See id. at 2082-84 (citing Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922,
936-42 (1982)).
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of law. In essence, they permit the litigants to help the government select an
impartial trier of fact. As to the second prong of the Lugar test, the Court held
that a private litigant must be deemed a state actor when using a peremptory
challenge because that private party made extensive use of a state procedure
with the overt, significant assistance of state officials.101 The party who
exercises a peremptory challenge invokes the formal authority of the state
court, which discharges the prospective juror; the court thereby makes itself a
party to the biased act.
By analogy to Edmonson, a state court makes itself a party to an
employer's deprivation of an employee's First Amendment rights when it
dismisses the employee's wrongful discharge complaint. In dismissing the
complaint, the court condones and sanctions the employer's retaliation for the
exercise of protected speech. By rejecting the First Amendment as a source of
public policy in wrongful discharge cases, the state court itself infringes upon
the employee's First Amendment rights. Just as a state court must construe the
doctrine of libel in a way that is consistent with free press, construe private
racially restrictive covenants in a way that is consistent with the Fourteenth
Amendment, and monitor the exercise of private peremptory challenges so that
they do not violate Equal Protection, so too must a state court construe the
common law tort of wrongful discharge in a manner that comports with the
First Amendment. Were a legislature to enact a statute that provided by its
terms that private-sector employers may fire employees for their political
views, that statute would most assuredly violate the First Amendment. That the
state actor is a court and not the legislature is immaterial: the Supreme Court
itself has stated that it makes no difference that the source of a rule is judge-
made common law.
In other words, the state action lies not in the employer's act of dismissing
the employee; it lies in the court's act of creating an exception to the
employment at will rule for certain categories of employee speech, but
consciously refusing to include free speech. Private parties may violate the
Constitution with wild abandon, but under certain circumstances courts may
not countenance that conduct. Applying the Lugar test, it becomes clear that the
private employer's deprivation of the employee's First Amendment rights has
its source in a state-created right or privilege, specifically the judicial doctrine
of employment at will and the common law of contract. The deprivation is
fairly attributable to the state in that a state official, namely a judge, has
construed that doctrine not to protect speech. There is a nexus between the
official act to dismiss an employee's wrongful discharge complaint and the
deprivation; the employee is deprived of any state judicial remedy for loss of
101 See id. at 2084.
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employment. Other employees may be deterred from exercising their free
speech rights if they know that courts will not recognize the exercise of their
rights as protected by a public policy.
Professor St. Antoine suggests an interesting hypothetical case: Suppose a
property owner discriminates on the basis of race as to whom the owner will
permit to enter his or her property. An African American enters the property
without the owner's consent, and the owner brings an action for trespass. May
the court sanction the property owner's race-based classification without
violating the Constitution? The answer is yes, but there is a key analytical
difference between this hypothetical case and the cause of action advocated in
this Article. In the common-law tort of trespass, the element at issue is only
whether the owner consents to the presence of the defendant on the property.
The race-based classification is not an element of the tort; the tort is content
neutral. The race-based classification is a creation of the property owner, but
the court need not address it to render a decision. In wrongful discharge cases,
the classification of public policy is an essential element of the tort, an element
created by the courts.
Perhaps one can distinguish between a wrongful discharge case and the
situation in Shelley v. Kraemer 02 because the latter case involves affirmative
judicial action, while the former involves judicial inaction. Specifically, in
Shelley, the state court was called upon to evict an African American family;103
in a wrongful discharge case, the court is simply failing to recognize a cause of
action. However, this distinction fails when one examines the Edmonson case.
In Edmonson, the Court held that judicial inaction-standing idly by while
private parties disqualified civil jurors based upon race-itself violated the
Fourteenth Amendment. 1 4
Moreover, one could argue that the wrongful discharge case itself
represents a case of judicial action, as distinguished from inaction. The state
courts have actively created a classification based on the content of a dismissed
employee's speech. They have interfered with political speech by making it a
disfavored category in wrongful discharge suits. They have chosen to protect
the employee who files a workers' compensation claim and the employee who
blows the whistle on employer misconduct, but not the employee who lobbies
for political causes of which the employer disapproves. By creating a
classification for protected and unprotected speech that adversely impacts upon
political speech rights, the courts have engaged in state action that arguably
violates the Constitution.
The Supreme Court will subject a classification of speech based upon its
102 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
103 Id. at 13-21.
104 See supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text.
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content to strict scrutiny. Recently, in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, the Court
reiterated that "[c]ontent-based regulations are presumptively invalid."105 In
addition, the Court struck down a hate speech ordinance that classified
proscribable speech-fighting words-on the basis of its content. As part of its
justification for striking down the statute, the Court observed:
Displays containing abusive invective, no matter how vicious or severe, are
permissible unless they are addressed to one of the specified disfavored topics.
Those who wish to use fighting words in connection with other ideas-to
express hostility, for example, on the basis of political affiliation, union
membership, or homosexuality-are not covered. The First Amendment does
not permit St. Paul to impose special prohibitions on those speakers who
express views on disfavored subjects. 106
Granted, the statute in question proscribed certain speech, while the wrongful
discharge tort protects employees' speech. This case does suggest however,
that in the area of speech, an underinclusive classification based on content
deserves constitutional scrutiny.
That courts engage in state action within the reach of the Constitution is
consistent with Professor Laurence Tribe's position.107 Tribe suggests that a
plaintiff may establish state action either through direct suit against a state
actor, or by a direct challenge to a rule of the state's highest court. Even when
that challenge involves private parties, the action of the state's courts will
provide the requisite government involvement.108 Moreover, the state may not
construe its laws in a way that facilitates private interference with free speech.
In Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Committee, the Supreme Court
held that a state could not facilitate private "threats, harassment, and
reprisals"'1 9 against contributors to minor political parties by forcing them to
make public their list of contributors.
In the case of wrongful discharge, the judicially created and enforced rule
excluding free speech from protection similarly puts private-sector employers
in the position of being able to knowingly coerce vulnerable and economically
dependent employees. The courts had no obligation to recognize a tort for
wrongful discharge, but having done so, they must create a classification of
protected and unprotected employee activity that conforms to the Constitution.
105 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2542 (1992).
106 Id. at 2547 (emphasis added).
107 LAURENCE TRIBE, CONSrrrUTIONAL CHoicEs 246-266 (1985).
108 See generally id. at 253-65 (discussing "state action" in the context of a state
court's invocation of a permissive state rule to deny relief to a plaintiff injured by the action
of a private party).
109 Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 97 (1982).
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It is this classification and its status as law that gives rise to the implicit
constitutional problem in current wrongful discharge doctrine.
There is an easy way out of this box: courts need only construe the law of
wrongful discharge in a way that affords protection to free speech and
recognize that there is no logical nor doctrinal impediment to using the First
Amendment as a source of substantial and important public policy in these
cases. By going beyond mere payment of lip service to the principle that the
Constitution may provide the necessary public policy, courts can avoid the
implicit constitutional problem."10
It is a commonplace of statutory construction that courts should interpret a
statute to avoid finding it unconstitutional. The Supreme Court's treatment of
labor unions that use union dues for political purposes presents a case in
point. 111 The use of union dues for political purposes also provides an
opportunity for a private entity to coerce individual employee political
expression, by using mandatory union dues to finance political activities with
which an individual employee may disagree. 112 Although it has avoided the
inherent constitutional issues, in the case of labor unions, the Supreme Court
has nonetheless intervened. First, in Steele v. Louisville and Nashville Railroad
Co., 113 the Court avoided an Equal Protection issue raised by a labor union's
discrimination on the basis of race, by devising a duty of fair representation
which it read into the governing labor relations statute. This technique enabled
it to avoid the state action issue implicit in the certification of an exclusive
bargaining representative. Next, the Court read a limit on the use of mandatory
union dues into the terms of the Railway Labor Act. 114 Most recently, the
110 In his comments on Novosel v. Nationwide Ins., 721 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1983),
Professor Perritt acknowledges the logic of using the Constitution, and suggests that it is
inevitable. It is one of his arguments for statutory intervention to protect employers. See
PERRrrr, supra note 39, at 182-83.
111 See generally David H. Topol, Note, Union Shops, State Action, and the National
Labor Rekiions Act, 101 YAiE L.L 1135 (1992) (discussing the Supreme Court's reluctance
to reach the state action issue).
112 Cf. EMERSON, supra note 60, at 684-88.
113 323 U.S. 192 (1944). The Court prohibited a union from negotiating a separate
seniority list for black employees that would result in all black employees being laid off
before any white employee lost his job. The black members of the craft, which the union
had exclusive statutory authority to represent, had argued that the white employee union
violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause by denying black employees
membership and a right to vote on contracts that the white employee union negotiated.
Because the black employees were in the same bargaining unit, these contracts were binding
on the black employees. The Court avoided the state action question, but held that the union
had a duty to fairly represent all members of the craft. Id. at 204-07.114 See Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88 (1988); International Ass'n of
1994]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURiTAL
Court has imported analogous limitations into the National Labor Relations
Act.115
The Illinois Supreme Court's decision in Barr 16 best represents the
current resistance to the analogous solution in wrongful discharge cases. In
Barr the Court reasoned that the First Amendment represents a policy placing
limits only on the state; it does not represent a bar against private deprivations.
Accordingly, in the absence of state action, the First Amendment affords no
remedy. 117 This argument, however, is a non sequitur in a wrongful discharge
case. The courts have recognized a tort for wrongful discharge to remedy
certain cases in which a private-sector employer abuses its power. The courts
recognized this tort because the statute, case, or regulation the employee cited
as embodying public policy did not prohibit the employer from firing him or
her.118 In other words, it was precisely because there was no other remedy that
the courts had to intervene. Where there are statutory remedies available,
courts will not recognize the tort. 119 Similarly, in the case of free speech, the
Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961); Railway Employees v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225,
238 (1956). The Court held that there are limits on how a union may use dues paid by an
employee who objects to the union's political activities. An objecting employee may only be
required to pay that proportion of annual dues used for activities related to collective
bargaining, contract administration, and grievance adjustment. Street, 367 U.S. at 765-75.
The Court later extended this rule to all public sector employees. See Abood v. Detroit
Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234-35 (1977). See generally Martin H. Main, The Legal
Status of Union Security Fee Arbitration After Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson, 29 B.C.
L. REv. 857, 867-73 (1988) (discussing Abood's ambiguous treatment of First Amendment
freedom of association).
115 See Communications Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 744-62, cert. denied, 487
U.S. 1233 (1988). See generally Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Union Security Agreements
Under the National Labor Relations Act: the Statute, the Constitution, and the Court's
Opinion in Beck, 27 HARv. J. ON LEGIs. 51 63-72 (1990) (discussing the importation of the
Street Railway Labor Act holding into the National Labor Relations Act and the Court's
avoidance of the constitutional question).
116 See Barr v. Kelso-Burnett Co., 478 N.E.2d 1354 (Ill. 1985).
117 Id. at 1356-57.
118 In Hansen v. Harrah's, 675 P.2d 394 (Nev. 1984), the court held that the "failure
of the legislature to enact a statute expressly forbidding retaliatory discharge for filing
workmen's compensation claims does not preclude this Court from providing a remedy for
what we conclude to be tortious behavior." Id. at 396.
119 For a discussion of preemption of common-law wrongful discharge claims by other
remedies and the requirement that employees exhaust administrative remedies before filing
a wrongful discharge suit, see SHEPARD ET AL., supra note 2, at 251-74. In the public
sector, the Supreme Court took an analogous position in Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367
(1983). In Bush, an aerospace engineer made public statements to the news media critical of
a NASA facility. The Court held that while the employee did raise a First Amendment
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First Amendment affords a private-sector employee no direct remedy against a
private-sector employer. 120
For example, the classic wrongful discharge paradigm involves employees
who file a claim for workers' compensation following a workplace injury.
Prior to recognition of the wrongful discharge tort, such employees were
subject to dismissal and had no recourse. Typically, an employer would fire an
employee in retaliation for the employee's filing of a workers' compensation
claim. A pattern of such dismissals would deter other injured employees from
exercising their rights to workers' compensation under the statutes. Because
employer's contributions for workers' compensation insurance had been
determined by their claims experience, employers had a direct financial
incentive to deter employees from filing claims. The important public policy at
stake was the protection of injured workers, and their financial security.
Because the workers' compensation statutes themselves provided no remedy for
an employee who was dismissed under these circumstances, the courts
intervened to recognize a cause of action for wrongful discharge. In doing so
the courts rejected the argument that employers had violated no part of the
workers' compensation statute.
Similarly, it is no answer to reason that the First Amendment itself
provides no remedy to the employee in the absence of state action. Employees
have constitutional rights to participate in our democracy-rights to speak in
support of candidates they want to elect. They also have a First Amendment
right not to support candidates or political positions, whether through financial
contributions, attendance at a captive audience speech, or signing a petition or
political endorsement. This right is part of the public policy underlying the
First Amendment. It is precisely because there is no direct remedy that the
courts should use the doctrine of wrongful discharge to protect the public
question, his claim was covered by a comprehensive procedural and substantive remedy
under federal civil service rules; therefore, the Court refused to create a new remedy, and
deferred to the administrative process. Id. at 380-90. For examples related to employee
health and safety, see Theresa Ludwig Kruk, Annotation, Liability for Discharge of At-will
Employee for In-plant Complaints or Efforts Relating to Workng Conditions Affecting Health
orSafely, 35 A.L.R. 4TH 1031, 1032-35 (1985).
12 0 This paper does not advocate that we dispense entirely with the state action
requirement for all constitutional litigation. It argues that the state action requirement is
satisfied when a state court creates a classification based on the content of an employee's
speech when deciding a wrongful discharge claim. Beyond that, following the same
arguments that courts used to justify the wrongful discharge tort for other forms of public
policy, extension of the tort to discharges based on employee speech is necessary to protect
society's interest in the public policy underlying the First Amendment. Even if the state
action argument fails, there are significant public policy reasons for expanding the wrongful
discharge tort to protect employee political speech.
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policy inherent in the First Amendment, namely the policy that affords our
citizens full political participation in our democracy.
V. THE LIMITS ON A WRONGFUL DISCHARGE SUIT USING THE FIRST
AMENDMENT AS PUBLIC POLICY
One can speculate that most courts have been reluctant to choose this
course for fear it would effectively "constitutionalize" the workplace.121 There
is already ample concern that the wrongful discharge tort has vastly increased
potential employer liability. Some argue that the employer hysteria in response
to the tort is a product of the self-interested exaggeration of risk by employers'
advisors.122 However, a review of existing wrongful discharge decisions and
cases involving public employee free speech shows that we have nothing to
fear but fear itself. Courts would find ready-made limits on disruptive
employee speech in the public forum doctrine and in the balancing test
developed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Connick v. Myers. 123 Moreover,
courts probably would adopt the exception for high policymaking and
confidential employees which occasionally justifies dismissal of a public sector
employee. Furthermore, the workplace would not qualify as a public forum,
but an employee could use traditional public fora outside work without fear of
retaliation. Although an employee who spoke out on primarily personal matters
would not benefit from extension of the tort, it would protect employees who
engage in nondisruptive speech on matters of public concern.
In the area of public employee speech, federal courts have developed an
entire analytical structure based upon concern for the efficiency of public
employees. If the courts can balance employee free speech against workplace
efficiency even in the public sector, it stands to reason that the same balancing
test would apply to private-sector employee speech. Government functions
effectively as an employer even though the First Amendment protects its
employees; private-sector employers would function effectively as well.
Finally, the tort would not limit employer free speech; it would simply prohibit
employers from firing employees in retaliation for the employees' speech or
political activities.
121 See, e.g., PERr=r, supra note 39, at 402: "The Novosel doctrine has attracted few
supporters, but it is an important model for possible future expansion of the public policy
tort into a constitutionalization of private employment."
122 Lauren B. Edelman, et al., Professional Construction of Law: The Inflated Threat
of Wrongfu Discharge, 26 LAw & Soc'YREv. 47, 74-78 (1992).
123 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
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A. In Response to the Slippery Slope Argument Against
Constitutionalizing the Workplace
Some might argue that the First Amendment cannot provide a public policy
rationale for protection of speech in wrongful discharge cases because it would
lead to the incorporation of the entire Bill of Rights into the workplace. For
example, some might contend that protecting employees' constitutional right to
privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment is the next logical step after this
development. Some wrongful discharge cases have addressed employees' rights
to socialize or have sexual relationships with coworkers; employees generally
have not prevailed in these cases.124 For example, the Supreme Court reiterated
in Bowers v. Hardwick that it has never recognized a constitutional right to
engage in either heterosexual or homosexual consensual sex.125 Thus, it is
124 In Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 335 N.W.2d 834 (Wis. 1983), the court
dismissed a wrongful discharge complaint in which an employee alleged that his employer
had fired him for having an open affair with his secretary while he was still married, among
other reasons. While recognizing the exception to the employment at will doctrine for
employer conduct that violates a clear mandate of public policy, the court held that the
employee had failed to prove such a policy through evidence of a constitutional or statutory
provision. Id. at 840. In Grzyb v. Evans, 700 S.W.2d 399 (Ky. 1985), the employee
alleged that a hospital fired him for fraternizing with a female employee. The court held that
the constitutional protection of freedom of association did not provide a public policy
justification for his wrongful discharge claim. To the extent that the plaintiff made
arguments of sex discrimination, the court replied:
[a]ssuming it was sufficiently alleged, the claim of sex discrimination would
not qualify as providing the necessary underpinning for a wrongful discharge suit
because the same statute that enunciates the public policy prohibiting employment
discrimination because of 'sex' also provides the structure for pursuing a claim for
discriminatory acts in contravention of its terms.
Id. at 401. The employee also lost in Patton v. J.C. Penney Co., 719 P.2d 854 (Or. 1986).
The employee alleged that he was fired for maintaining an off-work social relationship with
a female employee, after the employer had asked him to break it off. The employee claimed
that the employer invaded his personal right of privacy, but the court rejected his claim
holding that it would pertain at best to a right against government infringement of his
privacy. Id. at 857.
125 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). The Court observed: "Moreover, any
claim that these cases nevertheless stand for the proposition that any kind of private sexual
conduct between consenting adults is constitutionally insulated from state proscription is
unsupportable. Indeed, the Court's opinion in Carey twice asserted that the privacy right,
which the Griswold line of cases found to be one of the protections provided by the Due
Process Clause, did not reach so far." Id. at 191.
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difficult to see how employees' activity other than speech could establish a
classification that is subject to constitutional scrutiny, let alone an expansion of
the tort for reasons of public policy. Employees would have to rely on a state
constitutional provision for their arguments in nonspeech cases.126
Moreover, to the extent that employer decisions adversely affect issues of
family choice, childbearing, and abortion, they would be subject to scrutiny
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act127 and the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act. 128 State courts faced with these issues would probably defer to these other
available remedies and refuse to recognize a wrongful discharge cause of
action. 129 The recent litigation concerning an employee's right to work free
from pressure to submit to voluntary sterilization is instructive on this point. In
UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc.,130 the Supreme Court held that an employer
violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 when it established a policy
barring all women except those whose infertility was medically documented
from jobs involving actual or potential lead exposure. The employer attempted
to use OSHA standards to justify its policy, but the Court held that a gender-
126 The employee prevailed in Rulon-Miller v. International Business Mach. Corp.,
208 Cal. Rptr. 524 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984). She alleged that she was fired because of her
romantic involvement with the manager of a rival firm. The court found that IBM fired her
in subjective bad faith because it was aware of her relationship before it appointed her
manager. The court also found that IBM violated a public policy, specifically California's
state constitutional protection of the right to privacy. Id. at 534.
127 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988). See generally MACK PLAYER, FmERAL LAw OF
EMPLoYMENT DISCRIMATION 127-28 (1980). Courts have not used Title VII to protect
employees fired for their political views or expression. One employee alleged discrimination
on the basis of personal religious creed when his employer allegedly fired him because he
apparently consumed Kozy Kitten Cat Food on the job; the employee alleged that it
contributed significantly to his state of well-being and therefore to his overall work
performance. The court rejected the claim. See Brown v. Pena, 441 F. Supp. 1382, 1384-
85 (S.D. Fla. 1977).
Title VII does protect a specific form of employee speech, namely, speech in
opposition to an unlawful employment practice. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (1988); see also
EEOC v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 720 F.2d 1008, 1011-14 (9th Cir. 1983). However,
one court has observed that "Congress certainly did not mean to grant sanctuary to
employees to engage in political activity for women's liberation on company time, and an
employee does not enjoy immunity from discharge for misconduct merely by claiming that
at all times she was defending the rights of her sex by opposing discriminatory practices."
Hochstadt v. Worcester Found. for Experimental Biology, 545 F.2d 222, 230 (1st Cir.
1976).
128 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988).
129 See, e.g., Grzyb v. Evans, 700 S.W.2d 399, 401 (Ky. 1985); Allen v. Safeway
Stores, Inc., 699 P.2d 277, 283 (Wyo. 1985).
130 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
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based fetal-protection policy must pass the test for a bona fide occupational
qualification. The Court did not resort to the constitutional right to privacy. 131
Due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments would have
limited application, because employees in the private-sector generally have no
property right to their job, and in the absence of a protected interest, no
process is due. 132 Generally, any property interest is the product of an express
written contract of employment for a definite term not covered by the
employment at will doctrine. In the alternative, a few courts have implied a
contract from an employee's reasonable reliance on employer representations
contained, inter alia, in an employee handbook. 133 In that case, the procedure
for terminating that property interest would likely lie within the four comers of
the contract; there would be no public policy at issue.
The employee interest in reputation is protected under existing libel and
slander tort remedies,134 so courts would not feel pressed to invent a new
remedy. For example, in Paul v. Davis,135 the plaintiff argued that the state
deprived him of due process when it circulated his name and photograph on a
flyer captioned "active shoplifters," thereby depriving him of his liberty
interest in reputation. The Supreme Court rejected the claim, holding that one
must prove something more than simple defamation by a state official to
establish a constitutional claim.
131 Id. at 197-200.
132 Whether the employee works in the public or the private sector, such property
interests are created and their dimensions defined by state law. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ.
v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538 (1985). See generally JOHN E. NowAK & RONALD D.
ROTUNDA, CONsrrtrrIONAL LAw463-87 (4th ed. 1991).
133 E.g., Finley v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 499 A.2d 64, 72-76 (Conn. App. CL
1985) (holding that employee stated a cause of action when he alleged that the employer
fired him in breach of an employment contract contained in employer's personnel policy
and procedures manual), rev'd, 520 A.2d 208 (Conn. 1987). See generally Theresa Ludwig
Kruk, Right to Discharge Allegedly At-will Employee as Affected by Employer's
Promulgation of Employment Policies as to Discharge, 33 A.L.R. 4Ti 120 (1984).
134 E.g., Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 361 N.W.2d
875, 881-84 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that employees properly recovered for
defamation when employer fired them for gross insubordination when they refused to falsify
expense reports), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 389 N.W.2d 876 (Minn. 1986); Lewis v.
Oregon Beauty Supply Co., 733 P.2d 430, 433-34 (Or. 1987) (holding that employee stated
a claim for intentional interference with an economic relationship when employer told other
employees that she had given him a venereal disease, and when employee ultimately
terminated employment); Agriss v. Roadway Express, Inc., 483 A.2d 456, 462-63 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1984) (holding that employee falsely charged with reading company mail stated a
cause of action).
135 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
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Similarly, search and seizure rules under the Fourth Amendment have little
application, because employees generally have a limited expectation of privacy
in the workplace. There might be an exception for employer surveillance of
restrooms, but public opinion, unions, and state legislatures are already
intervening to protect employees from this specific form of surveillance. 136
This free speech analysis might serve also as a model in wrongful discharge
cases involving employee drug testing programs because courts have rejected
claims using the Fourth Amendment or the right to privacy due to the lack of
state action. 137 This is another area, however, in which states have intervened
with legislation. 138 Moreover, one court applied a balancing test, ruling that the
employer's interest in safety outweighed any employee right to privacy. 139
The First Amendment is the only provision of the Bill of Rights in which a
source of public policy matches a serious need for a remedy-a need that the
courts have not met through the use of other legal theories.
B. The Public Forum Doctrine as a Limit on Private-Sector Employee
Speech
Employers might properly be concerned that recognizing the First
Amendment as a source of public policy in wrongful discharge actions would
permit employees to disrupt the workplace while exercising their rights.
Employers might be concerned that this remedy would permit employees to
136 In California, a dentist installed a two-way mirror in the restroom of his office so
that he could observe employees while they changed their clothes and used the toilet. See
North Ad. Casualty and Sur. Ins. Co. v. William D., 743 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
The court observed that this represented a misdemeanor criminal violation, and ruled that it
was not covered by the dentist's professional liability insurance policy. Id. at 1365-66. The
employees apparently filed suit alleging state law claims of invasion of privacy, mental
distress, nuisance, tortious breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
misrepresentation, and constructive wrongful discharge termination. The case settled
without a trial. Id. at 1363. In Stem v. New Haven Community Sch., 529 F. Supp. 31
(E.D. Mich. 1981), a court held that it was not a violation of the Fourth Amendment for a
principal to install a two-way mirror in the boys restroom of a high school in order to
observe drug dealing. The search was reasonable in light of the school's interest in the
search and the student's interest in privacy. Id. at 36-37.
137 E.g., Hennessey v. Coastal Eagle Point Oil Co., 609 A.2d 11 (N.J. 1992). See
generally Edward L. Raymond, Jr., Annotation, Liability for Discharge of At-Will Employee
for Refusal to Submit to Drug Testing, 79 A.L.R. 4TH 105 (1990).
138 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51x (West Supp. 1993); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 730.5 (West 1993); MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-304 (1993); R.I. GEN. LAws § 28-6.5-1
(Michie Supp. 1993); and VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 513 (1987).
139 Raymond, supra note 137 at 116.
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disrupt the workplace with leafleting, solicitation for candidates or signatures,
and other employee political activities. During the past fifty years, however,
the Supreme Court has developed certain limits on free speech, subjecting it to
reasonable regulation as to time, place, and manner. 14° It is not an absolute
right: government may suppress fighting words, obscenity, child pornography,
libel, defamation, and incitement to imminent lawless action. 141
The developing doctrine of the public forum is another significant limit.142
Regulations are subject to strict scrutiny if they limit speech in traditional
public fora, such as parks or streets, that have from time immemorial been used
by the public for the free exchange of ideas. 143 The government must prove
that such regulations are narrowly tailored to effectuate a compelling state
interest. The same standard applies when the government designates a place as
a public forum.
However, where a place is not a public forum (for example, the interior of
an airport terminal), regulations limiting speech are subject to a lower level of
scrutiny; such regulations need only be reasonable. 144 With increasing
frequency, the Supreme Court has held that private property (and some public
property), even when open to the public for general social and commercial
purposes, is not a public forum. 145 This body of authority suggests that courts
140 See generally NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 132, at 1087-106.
141 Id. at 941-78; see also Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
142 See generally NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 132, at 1089-99.
143 See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
144 See International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 112 S. Ct. v. Lee, 112 S. Ct.
2701, 2708 (1992).
145 E.g., Krishna Consciousness, 112 S. Ct. at 2705-08 (1992) (holding public port
authority may prohibit public from engaging in repetitive solicitation inside publicly-owned
airport terminal because it does not represent a traditional public forum that from time
immemorial has been used for purposes of free expression and the exchange of ideas, and
because government has not designated it as a public forum); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal
Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 799-806 (1985) (holding that Combined Federal
Campaign charity fund drive was not a public forum even though created by Executive
Order); Greer v. Spoeck, 424 U.S. 828, 834-38 (1976) (holding that public areas of Fort
Dix are not a public forum); Hudgens v. National Labor Relations Bd., 424 U.S. 507,
520-21 (1976) (holding shopping center may prohibit union members from engaging in
peaceful picketing of employer who operated retail store in shopping center, because
shopping center represents private property, and is not a public forum); Lloyd Corp. v.
Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 561-70 (1972) (holding shopping mall owner may prohibit antiwar
protesters from distributing literature inside shopping mall because it is private property
open for commercial purposes and does not represent a public forum). For commentary
criticizing this development, see David Kairys, Freedom of Speech, in THE PoLrmcs OF
LAw: A PROGRESSIVE CRmQUE 237, 262--64 & n.80 (David Kairys ed., 2nd ed. 1990). The
Court has recognized that state constitutions may grant broader free speech rights than those
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recognizing the First Amendment as a source of public policy in a wrongful
discharge case would not treat the private-sector workplace as a public forum.
Rather, they would review restrictions on employee speech in the workplace in
light of the lower standard of reasonableness used by the Supreme Court for
nonpublic fora. 146
For example, in Perry Education Ass'n v. Peny Local Educators Ass'n,147
the Supreme Court held that a school board adopted a reasonable regulation
limiting access to school mailboxes. According to the Court, these did not
represent a limited public forum so a rival union was not entitled to have access
to them to distribute union campaign literature. 148 Such a rule from the public
sector would apply fully to the private-sector. While a few states define the
public forum more broadly for the purpose of their state constitution, 149 it is
unlikely that these decisions would reach private property not open to the
public. Most private-sector workplaces fall into this category. In other words,
the employer could probably prohibit employee solicitation, leafleting, political
campaigning, and similar potentially disruptive activities in the workplace, and
courts probably would find this rule to be reasonable.
Ideally, there would remain room for free employee speech in those cases
in which the employer owns all the property upon which a community is
located (the company town case). 150 The employer's actions in this
provided in the First Amendment. It upheld a state court decision mandating that an owner
of a shopping center permit free speech and petition activities on his private property. See
PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 80-88 (1980).
146 See International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2701, 2708
(1992). The Court held that strict scrutiny only applies to a restriction of speech in a public
forum. Because the airport terminal was a nonpublic forum, the Court held it need only
apply the lesser standard of reasonableness.
147 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
148 Id. at 45-49.
149 See, e.g., PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 80-88; State v. Schmid, 423 A.2d 615, 630-33
(N.J. 1980) (holding that Princeton University must open its property to free speech and
assembly because of the public's invitation to use the property), appeal dismissed, 455 U.S.
100 (1982); Alderwood Assocs. v. Washington Env. Council, 635 P.2d 108, 117 (Wash.
1981) (holding that a private shopping center must permit free speech activities under the
state constitution).
150 Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 502, 508-09 (1946) (upholding right of
Jehovah's Witnesses to distribute literature on streets and sidewalks of a company town, that
is, a town where the employer owned the stores, streets, sidewalks, and all other real estate
on which the town was located); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 94-96, 101-06 (1940)
(overturning on First Amendment grounds the loitering conviction of union organizers who
had been engaged in peaceful picketing on private property, at the entrance to the
employer's plant, where practically all of the employees lived on company property and got
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circumstance would be subject to the higher standard of scrutiny: to justify a
restriction on speech in the public areas of the company town, there would
have to be a compelling state interest.151 In a wrongful discharge case, the
employer would be the party imposing the restriction, so it would bear the
burden of justifying the restriction under the appropriate standard.
However, the public forum doctrine would not limit employee speech
outside the workplace. For example, an employer could not prohibit an
employee from campaigning for a political candidate by canvassing voters on
public streets and sidewalks, or working to get out the vote by making
telephone calls, or having signs in his or her front yard supporting a particular
candidate. All these activities would be taking place in public fora. The
employer could not limit an employee's use of printed and electronic media
outside the workplace to communicate a political view. Moreover, the
employee's exercise of speech in nonpublic fora other than the workplace
would not be subject to employer regulation. However, courts could recognize
an employer's legitimate interest in regulating conduct in the workplace in the
interests of productivity and efficiency by adopting limits analogous to the
public forum doctrine.
C. The Balancing Test for Disruptive Speech
There would be other protections for employers in addition to the public
forum doctrine. It is likely that state courts would adopt the same analysis that
federal courts use in First Amendment cases involving public sector employees.
Using the three-part test developed by the Supreme Court in Connick v.
Myers, 152 the state court could first determine whether the employee's speech
addressed a matter of public concern. If it did, the court would then determine
whether the employer's interest in the efficiency and productivity of the
workplace outweighs the employee's interest in speech. If the employer does
not prevail in this balancing test, the court could next determine whether
protected speech was a motivating factor in the employer's decision to dismiss
the employee. If so, the burden of proof would shift from the employee to the
employer, 153 who would have to demonstrate that it would have fired this
employee-notwithstanding the speech-for other legitimate reasons such as for
their mail from a post office on company property, and where the Union was permitted to
hold its meetings on company property).
151 Cy International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2701, 2715
(1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
152 461 U.S. 138, 142-54 (1983).
153 See Mount Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 284-87
(1977).
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just or good cause.
1. Speech on a Matter of Public Concern
This framework for analysis clarifies the existing body of wrongful
discharge precedent. For example, although state courts have routinely required
that employees demonstrate that their conduct was protected by an important or
substantial public policy, 154 any such conduct would most likely qualify as a
matter of public concern under the Supreme Court's standard.1 55 The Supreme
Court has ruled that speech on the school budget, 156 on a school desegregation
plan,157 on the efficient operation of a state prosecutor's office, 158 and about
the performance of the President159 all qualify as matters of public concern,
and therefore as protected speech. Clearly, reports that an employer had
violated criminal law or civil rules designed to protect the public safety would
qualify as matters of public concern. 160 Thus, a state court would reach the
same result applying a First Amendment analysis as the court that used
wrongful discharge to protect a quality control inspector who reported an
employer's weights and measures violations to the FDA. 161
This analysis would cover even the classic cases in which an employee was
154 See generally 1 LARSON, supra note 2, §§ 2.06-.07, 6.01-. 11.
155 For a more detailed analysis of existing case law on the requirement that speech
address a matter of public concern, see Stephen Allred, From Connick to Confision: The
Struggle to Define Speech on Matters of Public Concern, 64 IND. L.J. 43 (1988); Cynthia
K.Y. Lee, Freedom of Speech in the Public Workplace: A Comment on the Public Concern
Requirement, 76 CAL. L. REv. 1109 (1988); and D. Gordon Smith, Beyond Public
Concern: New Free Speech Standards for Public Employees, 57 U. C. L. REv. 249
(1990).
156 See Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
157 See Givhan v. Western Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 411-17 (1979).
158 See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 149 (1983).
159 See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987). In this case, a county clerical
employee was fired for a political remark made during a private conversation to a
coworker. Upon hearing of the attempted assassination of then President Reagan, she
commented: "if they go for him again, I hope they get him." The Supreme Court held that
this represented a comment upon a matter of public concern and constituted protected
speech under the First Amendment. Id. at 379-80, 384-92.
160 For an account of cases where employees raised concerns about matters of health
or safety, see Gregory G. Sarno, Annotation, Liability for Retaliation against At-will
Employee for Public Complaints or Efforts Relating to Health or Safety, 75 A.L.R. 4TH 13,
24-27 (1990).
161 See Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, 427 A.2d 385, 388-89 (Conn. 1980).
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discharged after filing a claim for workers' compensation.1 62 Although at first
blush such cases might seem to involve the personal exercise of a private right,
the state nevertheless has an interest in maintaining records regarding
occupational safety and health. It is a matter of public concern that we as a
country do business in a way that minimizes the risk of physical injury
employees face at the workplace. While workers' compensation was designed
to act as an expeditious source of compensation outside the judicial system, it
also serves as a way of keeping records on employer safety. Clearly, an
administrative agency or court responsible for resolving certain disputes would
qualify as a public forum for speech that initiated a dispute within its
jurisdiction.
This doctrine would not reach the individual employee complaint about
working conditions or compensation or other speech on matters of purely
personal concern. For example, in one reported case, a court dismissed an
employee's complaint that he was fired after he disclosed to coworkers that he
would be attending law school. 163 The court considered such speech to
represent comment on personal future career plans, and not on a matter of
public concern. State courts adopting the First Amendment as a source of
public policy need not protect such speech-the outcome of the case would be
the same. In Ellis v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., the court held that an employee
failed to state a wrongful discharge claim when he alleged that he was fired for
using an in-house grievance procedure to protest his failure to receive a pay
increase. 164 The court held that the case did not implicate public policy issues
as such had been construed by New Mexico courts. 165 Similarly, one can
162 For a review of the existing decisions recognizing a cause of action for retaliatory
discharge when an employer fires an employee for filing a workers' compensation claim,
see 1 LARSON, supra note 2, § 6.05 and DiSabatino, supra note 6, § 16. Kelsay v.
Motorola, Inc., 384 N.E.2d 353, 356-59 (1. 1978); Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas, 297
N.E.2d 425, 428 (Ind. 1973); Springer v. Weeks and Leo Co., 429 N.W.2d 558, 559 (Iowa
1988); Sventko v. Kroger Co., 245 N.W.2d 151, 153-54 (Mich. 1976); Hansen v.
Harrah's, 675 P.2d 394, 397 (Nev. 1984); Shanholtz v. Monongahela Power Co., 270
S.E.2d 178, 182 (W. Va. 1980).
163 See Scroghan v. Kraftco Corp., 551 S.W.2d 811 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977). The
employee announced his intention to attend law school at night and upon his dismissal cited
Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549 (N.H. 1974), for the proposition that an
employer may not discharge an employee for engaging in a lawful activity in which the
community has an interest. He argued that public policy favors continued education. The
court rejected the claim: "We think appellant's attendance at night school was a private
rather than a public concern." Scroghan, 551 S.W.2d at 812. Interestingly, the court used
the language of public sector cases to deny relief.
164 Ellis v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 754 F.2d 884 (10th Cir. 1985).
165 See id. at 885.
1994]
OHIO STATE LAWJOURNAL
speculate that courts would consider discussions about raises, salary cuts,
parldng privileges, benefits, transfers from one position or plant to another,
promotions, and demotions, as ordinary day-to-day personnel actions and
representing speech on matters of purely private concern.
2. Balancing Employee Speech Against Workplace Efficiency
The courts could balance the employer's interest in an efficient workplace
against the employee's interest in the speech. This balancing is precisely what
the Third Circuit did in Novosel, in which the court made explicit reference to
the public employee precedent. 166 This same test could also explain the
outcome in Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., in which the court rejected
a wrongful discharge claim. 167 The plaintiff-employee in Pierce was a
physician, working on a chemical formula for an antidiarrheal drug containing
saccharin, who refused to continue work on the project based on her concern
that saccharin was possibly a hazardous additive. The employer had engaged in
no illegal conduct, and the employee did not report the matter to the press or
any government agency before her dismissal. In this instance, a court applying
the Connick test would probably determine that the employer's interest in an
efficient workplace outweighed the employee's interest in speech. 168 Similarly,
in Pagdilao v. Maui Intercontinental Hotel, an employer prevailed in a
wrongful discharge suit brought by an employee fired for shouting obscenities
at a company picnic. 169 Clearly, the employee's speech was disruptive, and the
employer's interest in the well-being of others at the picnic outweighed any
interest the employee might have in the speech. In Korb v. Raytheon Corp., the
court held that the employer, a major defense contractor, properly fired its
lobbyist after the lobbyist spoke out against military spending. 170 The employer
argued that the employee could no longer be effective in his position, and the
court found "no public policy" that prohibited an employer from "discharging
an ineffective at will employee."171
One can envision other circumstances in which courts might reach a similar
conclusion, for example, a letter to the editor openly critical of an employer
decision might cause a disruption at the plant. For the court even to apply this
balancing test, such a letter would have to address something more than an
individual personnel decision-it would have to address a matter of public
166 See Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 741 F.2d 894, 899 (3d Cir. 1983).
167 Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 417 A.2d 505, 506-08 (N.J. 1980).
168 See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
169 Pagdilao v. Maui Intercontinental Hotel, 703 F. Supp. 863 (D. Haw. 1988).
170 Korb v. Raytheon Corp., 574 N.E.2d 370 (Mass. 1991).
171 Id. at 372.
[Vol. 55:341
EMPLOYEE FREE SPEECH
concern. For example, the letter might address the following: a decision to shift
production of a new product line to a different plant, diverting jobs away from
the community; a decision not to invest in new optional pollution control
technology or delay its purchase; a decision not to contribute to some
community fundraising project; or other matters involving the relationship
between an employer and the community in which it is located. While an
employee may legitimately hold strong views on the propriety of such a
decision, and while the public might legitimately be concerned about the
employer's decision, public criticism of the employer might nevertheless cause
friction between the employee and her supervisor, or between the employee
and other employees. In such cases, the employer might be able to establish
that its interest in efficiency outweighed the employee's interest in the
speech. 172 Historically, labor arbitrators have ruled against employees when
they exercise political speech in a manner that disrupts the workplace. 173
Moreover, in existing judicial decisions in wrongful discharge cases, courts
have rejected claims of employees whose speech disrupted the workplace.174
172 This discussion only addresses what protections might be made available by using
the First Amendment in a wrongful discharge case. It does not address what protections
employees may have under other laws such as the National Labor Relations Act. Professor
Malin suggests a different balancing test, namely one that weighs the employee's interest in
acting on his conscience against the employee's duty of loyalty to the employer. See Malin,
supra note 6, at 318.
173 See, e.g., Las Vegas Bldg. Materials, Inc., 83 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 998, 1000-01
(1984) (Richman, Arb.) (holding that while employer could not discharge employee for
espousing a philosophy of tax protests, it could dismiss him for disruptively refusing to
cooperate when employer was forced to garnish his wages in an IRS proceeding); Huron
Forge & Mach., 75 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 83, 96-97 (1980) (Roumell, Arb.) (holding that
grievant's disruptive and inflammatory leaflet provided just cause for dismissal); Hygrade
Food Prod. Corp., 74 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 99, 104-06 (1980) (O'Neill, Arb.) (holding that
the employer had just cause to dismiss the employee for violating company rules in the
course of advocating his political beliefs).
174 See, e.g., Newman v. Legal Servs. Corp., 628 F. Supp. 535, 539-40 (D.D.C.
1986) (holding that employees discharged for protesting managerial choices about the
delivery of legal services to the poor under the agency's mandate failed to state a cause of
action for wrongful discharge because the employer has a strong interest in assuring that
employees follow employer's policies and managerial ideology); Schultz v. Industrial Coils,
Inc., 373 N.W.2d 74, 74-77 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that even if the court assumed
arguendo that the state constitution protected the employee's letter to the newspaper
criticizing the employer and its officers, the speech would interfere with productivity and
efficiency, undermine authority or discipline, and otherwise disrupt the office within the
meaning of Connick v. Myers); Allen v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 699 P.2d 277, 283 (Wyo.
1985) (holding that employer was protecting legitimate business interest when he dismissed
employees who were rude to a state inspector, and who criticized the WIC program that he
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3. The Shifting Burden of Proof
Even when the speech addressed a matter of public concern and the
employer failed to prevail in the balancing test, that would not end a court's
inquiry. Many employers have already adopted a defensive posture of better
recordkeeping and supervision of problem workers. If an employer could prove
that an employee was fired for just or good cause, and would have been fired
regardless of the speech, state courts would probably dismiss the complaint.
This practice is well established in the context of collective bargaining
agreements, in which labor arbitrators developed the concept of progressive
discipline and require that an employer have just cause for dismissal. 175
Essentially, an employer must demonstrate that it has adopted reasonable
performance standards, made them known to employees, notified employees
who are not meeting the standards, and used progressive discipline to attempt
to correct the employee's performance. 176 If the employee fails to improve,
arbitrators generally will find that the employer has just cause to fire the
employee. Other criteria, like the employee's past record, evaluations, length
of service with the company, and treatment of other similarly situated
employees, can all play a role in an arbitrator's judgment of just cause. These
facts and circumstances would also be relevant to a court under a First
Amendment analysis. Essentially, they would have a bearing on an employer's
credibility and intent. If an employee has a long record of exemplary service,
and publicly supports a political stand with which the employer disagrees, a
court would scrutinize carefully any claim that the employer fired the employee
for performance problems rather than speech. On the other hand, if an
employee were on probation for chronic unexcused lateness, a controversial
speech on a public issue would not save that employee from dismissal.
administered). An analogous case is Bala v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review,
400 A.2d 1359, 1368 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1979) (holding state could deny unemployment
benefits to employee who disturbed employer hotel's guest when employee's speech was not
on a matter of public concern and represented rudeness to guest).
17 5 See generally ELKOuRI & ELKouRI, supra note 55, at 651-92; OWEN
FAiRWFATHER, PRACrICE AND PROCEDURE IN LABOR ARBIRATION 442-45 (2d ed. 1983).
176 These standards and the ones that follow are drawn from Arbitrator Carroll
Daugherty's classic formulation of the seven guidelines for determining just cause, as set
forth in Enterprise Wire Co., 46 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 359, 363-64 (1966) (Daugherty, Arb.).
See generally MARviN F. HIL, JR. & ANTHONY V. SinIcRopi, REmEmES IN ARBIRATION
137-45 (2d ed. 1991).
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D. The Exception for High Policymaking Employees
In the public sector, the Presidents may choose their Cabinets, and the
secretaries their deputies, based entirely on their political views. The Supreme
Court recognizes that some government positions are ones in which the
political affiliation of the employee is a legitimate factor to consider.177 This is
a narrow exception; the Supreme Court has observed that party affiliation or
political belief is not necessarily relevant to every policymaking or confidential
position. 178 For example, the exception would not allow partisan considerations
in the hiring of a state university football coach, but would allow a governor to
select assistants to help write speeches, explain her views to the press, and
communicate with the legislature. 179 By analogy, the very top managers in a
corporation probably function best if they are in accord on the manner in which
issues of public policy affect corporate interests. However, this exception
would likely only cover the very inner circle and the chief executive officer.
This discussion is not an exhaustive analysis of how courts might apply
public sector precedent to limit the scope of a wrongful discharge action using
the First Amendment. However, it does point the way toward reasonable limits
that would safeguard an employer's ability to conduct business.
E. Anticipating the Scope of Protected Employee Speech
The remedy I advocate in this Article would address precisely the conduct
the Third Circuit found so reprehensible in Novosel.180 It would protect an
employee's use of a public forum to express political views during nonworking
hours. It would protect each employee's right to campaign for, contribute to,
and vote for the political candidate of his or her choice. It would also protect
employees from the employer who would coerce the employee to contribute to
or give overt support to a political cause or candidate with which the employee
did not wish to be associated. 181 For example, an employer could not coerce an
177 See Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 517-518 (1980) (holding that an employer
must prove that party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective performance
of the public office involved, and that the newly appointed county public defender failed to
meet his burden of proof when he fired two assistant public defenders solely because they
were Republicans).
178 Id. at 518.
179 Id.
180 See supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text.
181 Perhaps it would be wiser to follow Emily Post's rules: "Certain subjects, even
though you are very sure of the ground upon which you are standing, had best be shunned:
for example, criticism of a religious creed or disagreement with another's political
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employee to sign a petition, lobby for legislation, write his congressman or
representative, speak out at a public meeting, or attend a political event.
This last example may require some elaboration. How, for example, would
this remedy apply to the increasingly common practice of captive audience
stump speeches? In the 1992 presidential campaign, employers would often
arrange to provide a captive audience at the workplace for a candidate's photo
opportunity. Employees who attended these speeches said they did not feel free
to leave. In essence, the employee's physical presence in the audience gave an
illusion of support for the candidate. The employee was forced to associate
with a political candidate she might not support. Clearly, this represents a form
of coercion based upon the employee's political views. Under the remedy
advocated here, if an employer fired the employee for refusing to sit through
the speech, that employee would have a cause of action for wrongful discharge.
The public forum limit would subject the individual employee's exercise of
speech at the workplace to reasonable rules. However, it does not address an
employer's exercise of speech. In the instance of the captive audience speech,
an employer invites the press to witness the entire company's support of a
candidate. This is a classic case of an employer creating or designating a public
forum. This designation should trigger stricter scrutiny of the employer's
conduct. When an employee walks out of a captive audience speech, that
employee's conduct speaks of his or her view of the candidate; it is a form of
speech. For an employer to justify firing an employee in retaliation for that
speech, the employer should have to demonstrate a compelling interest in
maintaining the captive audience. While I am not prepared to argue in this
Article that such a compelling interest could never exist, it is difficult to
anticipate circumstances in which the employer could demonstrate one. Clearly,
it would be permissible under these rules for the employer to make a forum and
its speaker available to any employee who might wish to participate voluntarily.
That would represent the employer's exercise of protected corporate speech
under First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti. 182
Similarly, this remedy would not prohibit an employer from expressing
views to its employees on political issues generally. For example, it would not
prevent the employer from distributing literature on issues and candidates the
employer supports. Courts would probably determine that it was reasonable-
rational-for an employer to limit distribution of political literature at the
conviction." EMILY POST, EMILY PosT's ETIQuErrE 39 (Elizabeth L. Post ed., llth ed.
1965).
182 See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784-85 (1978)
(affirming that corporate speech is protected by the First Amendment; invalidating a
state law that purported to restrict corporate political speech to matters that materially
affected the corporation's business.).
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workplace to those candidates or issues the employer supports, or views as
being in its best business interests. Under this lesser test for a nonpublic forum,
the employer could freely exercise its corporate free speech rights. The
employee's interests are protected because an employee can always throw away
literature without reading it. We can distinguish this example from the captive
audience because in the latter case the employer has invited the candidate and
the press to use the workplace as a forum for a public speech, thereby creating
a public forum. Moreover, the employee is not free to disregard the speech as a
member of a captive audience.
F. The Costs of this Remedy
Rarely in constitutional jurisprudence do we balance First Amendment
rights against their costs. 183 However, what this paper proposes would be a
remedy in the area of employment law, albeit one that protects a public policy
derived from the Constitution. One can anticipate that a chief objection to this
remedy would lie in its potential economic impact upon employers. Critics of
the retaliatory discharge tort contend that it simply raises the costs of hiring and
firing. In fact, it merely changes one contract term in the employment
relationship, but leaves the employer free to recoup its cost by reducing other
benefits to the employee. 184
Relatively little empirical information is available on the cost to employers
of the wrongful discharge tort. One study of California cases concludes that the
annual cost of jury trials comes to $2.56 per worker. When one includes
estimates of payments and legal fees for the 95 % of all cases that settle without
going to trial, the total comes to an annual cost of $12.25 per worker. 185 In a
later, related study, the authors conclude that the cost of preventative measures
183 I thank Professor Emeritus Harry Pratter, Indiana University School of Law, for
this thought.184 See Note, supra note 6, at 1829.
185 James N. Dertouzos et al., The Legal and Economic Consequences of Wrongful
Temination, RAN/R-3602-ICJ (1988). In a study funded by the Rand Institute for Civil
Justice, the authors analyzed 120 jury trials in California between 1980 and 1986. They
determined that plaintifs won in about 68% of these cases, and that half of the winning
plaintiffs were awarded $177,000 or less. Id. at vii. They found that employers spent an
average of $80,000 in legal fees to defend a typical wrongful termination case during this
period. Id. at viii. However, they also determined that the majority of plaintiffs receive less
than $30,000 after post-trial reductions and legal fees, and that transaction costs represent
almost 60% of the money changing hands in these cases. Id. at ix. They suggest that given
these large transaction costs, alternative dispute resolution or mandatory arbitration may
benefit both parties.
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to avoid wrongful termination liability are the more significant costs, significant
enough to influence companies utilization of labor. 186 There is no similar
information for government employers, who have functioned with these or
analogous constitutional rules for at least two decades. 187 Although several
18 6 James N. Dertouzos & Lynn A. Karoly, Labor-Market Responses to Employer
Liability, RAND/R-3989-ICJ (1992). This follow-up study estimates that the total direct costs
of wrongful termination litigation are only about 0.1% of the total wage bill. Id. at xiii.
However, because firms are risk averse or because employers are trying to avoid larger
liabilities, the indirect costs of wrongful termination are analogous to the employer response
to a 10% wage increase. They suggest that there are benefits to the employer in increased
efficiency through limits on managers' discretion in decisions to fire employees. Id. They
also suggest that the liberality of a state's wrongful termination rules correlates with lower
employment. Id. at xii. Presumably, these effects would disappear if all states were to adopt
uniform rules on wrongful discharge.
187 One study documents the general rise in public employee litigiousness against state
and local government in response to a handful of Supreme Court decisions, but does not
focus on First Amendment issues. See Don Jaegal & N. Joseph Cayer, Public Personnel
Administration by Lawsuit: The Impact of Supreme Court Decisions on Public Employee
Litigiousness, 51 PUB. ADMN. REV. 211 (1991).
The General Accounting Office did a study of the costs of resolving federal employees'
discrimination complaints, including cases of discrimination based upon age, race, color,
sex, national origin, religion, or handicap. UNrrED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNrING OFFICE,
DISCRMINATION COwLAINTS, Rep. No. GAOHRD-89-141 (1989). The study reports
discrimination complaints at three agencies, the U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, U.S. Dept. of
Labor, and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Id. at 2. The SEC legal staff
reported that one case in fiscal year 1987 cost $40,000 in back pay and attorney's fees, and
in 1988 the SEC spent $147,477 ($145,000 in one large settlement, and $2,477 for six
weeks backpay in another) on five cases all settled without a trial: three closed with
corrective action within the agency, and two closed with backpay awards averaging $57,489
each. Id. at 5, 9. The attorney's fees and costs came to $32,500 for fiscal 1988, but there is
no information as to how these are distributed across the five cases. Id. The Dept. of
Agriculture spent $805,957 on 50 cases in 1987 (an average of $16,119 per case), and
$340,855 on 82 cases in 1988 (an average of $4,157 per case). Id. at 5. When a payment is
made after a lawsuit has been filed in a court, the payment generally comes from the
Judgment Fund (31 U.S.C. § 1304), a permanent indefinite appropriation used to pay
certain claims against the federal government. Id. at 1. In fiscal year 1987, this Fund paid
$6.5 million for 144 discrimination cases across the whole of federal government (an
average of $45,139 per case). The Judgment Fund paid $12 million for 156 cases in fiscal
year 1988 (an average of $76,923 per case). Id. at 5.
Jaegal reports 75 public employee lawsuits in 1988 based upon Supreme Court
decisions defining public employee constitutional rights. Jaegal & Cayer, supra, at 213. If
we assume that the costs of these cases are comparable to the costs of employment
discrimination cases, we can estimate that these cases, in total, cost state and local
government employers between $3,385,425 and $5,769,225. There were 14,476,000 state
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authors have argued against the wrongful discharge tort because of its possible
economic consequences, 188 another author has determined that the tort may
lead to economic efficiency by prompting employers to accept a just cause
firing standard in exchange for limited liability through a wrongful termination
statute.1
89
In the area of wrongful discharge, most courts have determined that the
benefits of protecting previously at will employees from dismissal in certain
circumstances outweigh these costs. One of the benefits for which little
quantitative information is available is the enhanced enforcement of federal and
state laws and regulations through the incremental acts of individual
employees.'90 Another benefit is the improvement in personnel administration
as employers attempt to avoid liability through more rigorous internal review
of dismissal decisions.
Using the First Amendment as a source of public policy in wrongful
discharge actions will expose employers to some additional liability. However,
the amount of that liability and its cost would probably be marginal compared
to the benefits gained through recognition of the wrongful discharge tort in
employee free speech cases. The limited evidence of cost indicates that the
direct costs of litigation are quite small. Most of the expense is the result of
employer efforts to enhance personnel administration to avoid liability. Because
these efforts have already taken place, recognizing an additional source of
public policy governing discharge cases will not significantly exacerbate these
costs to employers.
Finally, businesses do not vote. Whatever constitutional rights they have
are derivative, stemming from the freedom of association held by those who do
vote. Courts seriously disserve the First Amendment if they allow
considerations of marginal costs to associative enterprises to outweigh the
rights of voters.
and local employees in 1988. See BuREAu OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
STAsrIcAI ABsTRAcr OFTHE UNITED STATES 304 (1992). Using the higher 1988 figure for
total liability, we estimate that for all constitutional claims by employees the costs come to
40 cents per year per employee. This cost appears reasonable in light of the rights at stake.
188 See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMc ANALYSIS OF LAw 306-07 (3d ed. 1986)
(arguing against a broad good cause requirement and in favor of employment at will);
Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. Cm. L. REv. 947 (1984);
Sherwin Rosen, Commentary: In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CI. L. REv. 983
(1984).
189 See Alan B. Krueger, The Evolution of Unjust-Dismissal Legislation in the United
States, 44 mIDus. & LAB. REL. REv. 644 (1991).
190 For an effort to quantify the effects of whistleblowers on organizational change in
the federal sector, see James L. Perry, The Organizational Consequences of Whistleblowing,
Final Report to the Fund for Research on Dispute Resolution dated October 19, 1990.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Our democratic system is the product of careful balancing of one branch of
government against another, state against federal government, and the
individual against the state. When one sector aggregates too much power, the
great pendulum in this dynamic and living system swings back, wrenching
some of that power away. The judiciary in the majority of states caused just
such a pendulum swing when they recognized the tort of wrongful discharge.
Development of this tort was a significant and positive step toward balancing
the relationship between employer and employed in those areas in which the
relationship may affect society as a whole.
However, the pendulum has not yet swung its full course to bring the
system back into balance. A significant area of employee interest remains
unprotected. It is an area that directly affects the very basis for our democratic
society. Moreover, it is an area in which the imbalance in power has grown
dramatically since the courts first moved to recognize wrongful discharge as a
cause of action. Democracy is premised on the notion that each voter, acting
out of enlightened self-interest, will influence the decisionmaking of
government with his vote in a way that will bring the greatest good to the
greatest number. 91 When a few have the power to coerce what should be an
individual decision, there is a risk that the outcome will not bring the greatest
good to the majority, but rather only to that few. 192 This outcome could
threaten the integrity, and ultimately the fundamental health, of the living
system.
The First Amendment provides a critical tonic. We can test our ideas-the
foundation of our political choices-against the ideas of our neighbors, our
friends, our coworkers. This debate, and the competition of one notion with
another in the marketplace of ideas, provides the basis for our vote. 193 A
century of First Amendment jurisprudence stands for the proposition that in the
absence of some vital, compelling government interest, it is healthier for our
democracy to tolerate disparate viewpoints than to suppress them. Similarly it
is healthier for employers to tolerate diverse views than to attempt to suppress
191 See John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in CLAssIcs IN PoLmcAL PHILOsoPHY 436 (Jene
M. Porter ed., 1989).
192 Cf. Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 894, 900-01 (3d Cir. 1983).
193 See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, 3., dissenting).
Justice Holmes observed that "the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in
ideas-that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely
can be carried out." Id.
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them with threats to an employee's job security. This does not mean that
employers are forbidden to participate in the grand debate; they already have
the power and means to do so in the form of corporate free speech and the
PAC. It means only that an individual employee's disagreement with the
company party line should not form the basis for dismissal.
For over fifteen years, courts have acknowledged that the Constitution may
provide evidence of a substantial and important public policy in wrongful
discharge cases. To place the First Amendment in a disfavored status by
judicial fiat raises serious constitutional issues. There is no logical basis for
excluding free speech from the protected category of important public policies.
Therefore, courts can and should move to protect employees who can prove
they were fired for their political views.

